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THE IMAGINARY IMMIGRATION CLAUSE
Nikolas Bowie* & Norah Rast**
For the past century, the Supreme Court has skeptically scrutinized Congress’s
power to enact healthcare laws and other domestic legislation, insisting that
nothing in the Constitution gives Congress a general power to “regulate an individual from cradle to grave.” Yet when Congress regulates immigrants, the
Court has contradictorily assumed that Congress has “broad, undoubted
power” to do whatever it thinks necessary—even though no clause of the Constitution gives Congress any specific immigration power. The Court has explained this discrepancy with reference to the Chinese Exclusion Case, an
1889 decision in which it allegedly held that Congress possesses “sovereign”
power to regulate immigrants beyond Congress’s ordinary enumerated powers.
Absent this imagined Immigration Clause, the Court has offered no explanation for its anomalous review of Congress’s immigration laws.
This Article contests this traditional reading of the Chinese Exclusion Case as
well as the consequences that have followed from it. Throughout the first century of congressional and judicial resistance to Congress’s power to regulate
immigration, there was a broad consensus that Congress had no freestanding
power to regulate immigrants beyond its ordinary powers to regulate everyone
else. Far from disrupting this consensus, the author of the Chinese Exclusion
Case adhered to it before, during, and after his opinion. It was not until the
mid-twentieth century that the Supreme Court retroactively misread the Chinese Exclusion Case to authorize an extraconstitutional federal immigration
power. Yet these misreadings have never explained why the Court invalidates
ordinary domestic legislation even as it defers to federal immigration laws.
In contrast with scholars and immigration advocates who have sought to apply
the Court’s ordinarily skeptical scrutiny to the immigration context, we argue
that this history highlights the flaws of relying on judicial review to protect
disenfranchised minorities from a hostile and overzealous Congress. This review has functioned to muffle the serious legislative debate that animated the
resistance to the first century of federal immigration restrictions. Rather than
ask the courts to limit federal immigration laws just as they limit federal
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healthcare laws, we therefore argue that Congress itself should rethink whether
Article I permits the expanse of its immigration laws in effect today.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is a nation of immigrants whose Constitution, ironically, doesn’t mention immigration. 1 The document has a Commerce Clause,
a Taxing Clause, and even a Post Office Clause, but nothing like an Immigration Clause. 2 To be sure, the authors of the Constitution anticipated that many
new people would soon arrive in the country. They allowed Congress to tax
or ban the importation of enslaved people and to establish rules for how new
residents could become naturalized citizens. 3 But while the Constitution gives
the federal government many powers, it doesn’t give the government any specific power to regulate immigrants. 4
This constitutional omission has inspired many legal controversies since
1789. Yet Supreme Court opinions over the past century have dismissed the
omission as little more than a drafting error. “The Government of the United
States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the
status of aliens,” the Court wrote in 2012. 5 The Court has considered this

1. The United States has also been a nation of enslaved people whose Constitution originally didn’t mention slavery, and a nation of Native Americans, Alaskans, and Atlantic and Pacific Islanders whose Constitution doesn’t mention colonialism. These omissions are all related.
See Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1833–34 (2019); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 7 (2002); K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1882–83 (2019).
2. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & DAVID B. THRONSON, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 110 (7th ed. 2019); see Kerry Abrams, Essay, Plenary Power Preemption,  VA. L.
REV. , – (); Anne B. Chandler, Why Is the Policeman Asking for My Visa? The
Future of Federalism and Immigration Enforcement, 15 TULSA J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 209, 210
(2008); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24
(1984).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
4. This Article uses the term “immigrant” to describe people entering or inside the
United States who are not citizens of the United States. We recognize that the term often describes something different from the legal term “alien” or the neologism “noncitizen”: many U.S.
citizens once immigrated to the United States, and many people who are not U.S. citizens enter
the United States for purposes other than immigration. But in discussing the historical development of a constitutional power primarily used to restrict immigration, “immigrant” best captures the target of that power.
5. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012).
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power so obvious, so “sovereign,” that surely the authors of the Constitution
had no need to list it among Congress’s powers to tax or to naturalize people. 6
In fact, the Court has declared that “ ‘[o]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete.’ Thus, ‘in the exercise of its broad
power over immigration and naturalization, ‘Congress regularly makes rules
that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.’ ” 7 With this explicit blessing,
a federal government that lacks judicial approval to exercise “[a]ny police
power to regulate individuals as such” 8 has exercised what might be termed a
secret police power over immigrants. The government has given border agents
unreviewable discretion to exclude long-term residents returning home from
abroad; allowed immigration agents to raid schools and courthouses to arrest
children without warrants; required employers and public officials to deny
immigrants the right to work, to vote, or to collect the benefits paid for by
their income taxes; and permitted group trials to summarily separate immigrants from their families. 9
The existence of this federal power over immigrants hasn’t always been
so “undoubted.” When Congress passed its first immigration law in 1798,
James Madison spoke for many of the Constitution’s authors when he accused
the legislature of “exercis[ing] a power no where delegated to the federal government.” 10 The law, one of the Alien and Sedition Acts, authorized the president to deport any “alien” suspected of being dangerous to national security. 11
Madison and other critics described deportation as “among the severest of
punishments,” denouncing the idea that the Constitution silently gave Congress the power to deport immigrants. 12 “The Constitution gives to Congress
no power over aliens, except that of naturalization,” they added, 13 describing
naturalization as a power that “neither authorized Congress to prohibit the
migration of foreigners to any state, nor to banish them when admitted. It was
a power which at most could only authorize Congress to give or withhold the

6. See id. at 394–95 (“This authority rests, in part, on the National Government’s constitutional power to ‘establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and its inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations.”); see also Sessions
v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1248–49 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is some foundingera evidence that ‘the executive Power,’ Art. II, § 1, includes the power to deport aliens.”).
7. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305–06 (1993) (internal quotations omitted) (citation
omitted) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).
8. Nat’l Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 557 (2012).
9. See generally, e.g., ELIZABETH F. COHEN, ILLEGAL (2020); CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC &
GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON (2019); S. DEBORAH KANG, THE INS ON THE LINE
(2017); ERIKA LEE, AMERICA FOR AMERICANS (2019); JACOB SOBOROFF, SEPARATED (2020).
10. James Madison, Virginia Resolutions (Dec. 21, 1798), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 185, 189 (David B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg, Jeanne K. Cross & Susan Holbrook Perdue
eds., 1991).
11. Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800).
12. James Madison, The Report of 1800 (Jan. 7, 1800), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 10, at 303, 319.
13. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 3000 (1799) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin).
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right of citizenship.” 14 Madison was joined by a “mighty wave of public opinion” that sank the Alien and Sedition Acts and swept their authors out of Congress. 15 For the next century, many politicians and historians would recall the
deportation law as “unquestionably unconstitutional.” 16 Congress would not
attempt another immigration restriction until 1875. 17
This Article tells the story of how, from this inauspicious beginning, Congress’s power over immigration grew into its modern, undoubted form. Part I
describes how for over a century after the perceived excesses of 1798, when
members of Congress debated immigration laws, most members conceded
that Congress was limited to tasks enumerated in the Constitution. 18 These
included the power to declare war, make treaties, naturalize citizens, protect
civil rights, and, most importantly, to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” and make “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers.” 19 Part II follows Congress as it resumed
regulating immigration in the nineteenth century after its members had concluded that the power to regulate “Commerce” included the power to regulate
passengers on incoming ships. 20 The Supreme Court ratified this conclusion
in 1884, calling the first federal immigration restrictions “the mere incident of
the regulation of commerce—of that branch of foreign commerce which is
involved in immigration.” 21

14. Federal Legislature, AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), June 13, 1798 (statement of
Sen. Henry Tazewell).
15. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Priestley (Mar. 21, 1801), in 33 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 393, 394 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2006).
16. 1 H. VON HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 142 (John J. Lalor & Alfred B. Mason trans., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1889) (1876); see,
e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 68 (1855) (speech of Rep. L.M. Keitt).
17. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974); Gerald L. Neuman, The
Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1883 (1993)
(describing immigration regulation before 1875 as primarily driven by states, bolstered by federal diplomatic and executive action).
18. This Part complements the foundational works of Mary Sarah Bilder, Sarah Cleveland, Hidetaka Hirota, Gerald Neuman, Lucy Salyer, and other scholars who have richly chronicled the evolution of public officials’ perspectives on the source of the power to regulate
immigration. See, e.g., HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR (2017); CHARLES J. MCCLAIN,
IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY (1994); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION
(1996); LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS (1995); Cleveland, supra note 1; Mary Sarah
Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce, 61
MO. L. REV. 743 (1996); Neuman, supra note 17; Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion:
Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 31, 47 (2010). As discussed below, we part company with these trailblazers in our interpretation of the Chinese Exclusion Case and its long-term effect on constitutional law.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 18; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–16 (war); id. art. II, § 2 (treaties);
id. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (naturalization); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (civil rights).
20. Bilder, supra note 18, at 790–824.
21. Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 595 (1884); see also Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1876) (“[T]he transportation of passengers from

1424

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:1419

The identification of immigrant passengers with foreign commerce
proved to be a capacious source of regulatory power. When the Supreme
Court first interpreted the Commerce Clause in 1824’s Gibbons v. Ogden,
Chief Justice Marshall wrote that it had “always been understood, [that] the
sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to
those objects.” 22 By “limited,” Marshall meant that Congress’s regulatory authority extended only to the powers conferred by the Constitution. By “plenary,” Marshall meant that if a subject involved commerce across state or
national boundaries, then Congress’s power over that subject “acknowledges
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.” 23 Marshall conceded that Congress might abuse its “plenary” authority to regulate commerce, but observed that “[t]he wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their
identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at
elections are, in this, as in many other instances, . . . the sole restraints on
which [the people] have relied, to secure them from its abuse.” 24 In other
words, Marshall argued that voters participating in the political process—not
the federal judiciary—should prevent undisciplined regulations of commerce.
In the decades after Congress and the Supreme Court extended this “plenary” regulatory power to the subject of immigration, the Court repeated
Marshall’s observation that electoral politics should be the only restraint on
Congress’s discretion. 25 This restraint proved unbridled in practice, however,
as domestic white voters increasingly urged Congress to exclude immigrants
who had no countervailing influence at the polls. 26 Nevertheless, the Court
maintained that “the authority of Congress over foreign commerce and its
right to control the coming of aliens into the United States” was a “complete”
and “plenary power.”27 Most notably, in the Chinese Exclusion Case of 1889,
the Court upheld Congress’s power to exclude a Chinese immigrant despite

European ports to those of the United States . . . . has become a part of our commerce with foreign nations, of vast interest to this country, as well as to the immigrants who come among us to
find a welcome and a home within our borders.”).
22. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
23. Id. at 196.
24. Id. at 197.
25. For example, in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, the Court wrote that
Congress’s power to regulate immigration was “not open to discussion” because of “the authority of Congress over foreign commerce and its right to control the coming in of aliens into the
United States, and to regulate that subject in the fullest degree.” 214 U.S. 320, 334 (1909). Although this sentence leaves it ambiguous whether the Court was referring to foreign commerce
and the “right to control the coming in of aliens” as one “subject” of regulation or as two separate
sources of power, the Court added in the next sentence: “Whatever difference of opinion, if any,
may have existed or does exist concerning the limitations of the power resulting from other provisions of the Constitution, so far as interstate commerce is concerned, it is not to be doubted
that from the beginning Congress has exercised a plenary power in respect to the exclusion of
merchandise brought from foreign countries.” Id. (quoting Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470,
492–93 (1904)).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 310–316.
27. Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 334, 343.
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preexisting treaties and statutes that promised to admit immigrants in his situation. 28 Quoting a different Marshall opinion, the Court described Congress’s powers to make treaties and regulate foreign commerce as “sovereign
powers, restricted in their exercise only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct
of all civilized nations.” 29 Because the power to exclude foreigners was “an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a
part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution,” the Court held
that the powers could not be “granted away or restrained on behalf of any
one,” much less a Chinese immigrant. 30 Instead, “the last expression of the
sovereign will must control.” 31
At the time it was decided, the Chinese Exclusion Case was regarded as a
relatively unimportant decision. From the perspective of the justice who authored the opinion, 32 the readers who first reported on it, 33 and the judges who
first cited it, 34 the decision did little more than hold that no statute or treaty
could prevent Congress from exercising its enumerated powers. The Court’s
use of the term “sovereignty” was no different from Marshall’s use of the same
language to describe the Commerce Clause and other enumerated powers.
Decisions in the decades that followed the Chinese Exclusion Case continued
to locate Congress’s power to regulate immigration in enumerated powers like
the Commerce Clause. 35
In the early twentieth century, however, as the historical context surrounding the 1889 decision was forgotten, the Supreme Court began to interpret the Chinese Exclusion Case differently: as a turning point in the history of
Congress’s immigration power. Taking the “incident of sovereignty” language
out of context, the Court cited the Chinese Exclusion Case as if it held that “the
power to expel or exclude aliens [w]as a fundamental sovereign attribute . . . largely immune from judicial control.” 36 Even in the context of domestic legislation, where no clause in the Constitution specifically authorized

28. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603–04
(1889).
29. Id. at 604 (referencing Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)).
30. Id. at 609.
31. Id. at 600.
32. See Juilliard v. Greenman (The Legal Tender Case), 110 U.S. 421, 467 (1884) (Field,
J., dissenting); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 746–50 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
33. See, e.g., Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Chinese Exclusion Act—Treaty Rights, 3
HARV. L. REV. 136, 136 (1889).
34. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903); cf. In re Florio, 43 F. 114,
115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890) (considering Congress’s power “to regulate the admission of alien passengers coming to this country” without reference to the Chinese Exclusion Case).
35. See, e.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 340 (1909).
36. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 581); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
542 (1950) (“The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems
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Congress to regulate immigrants, the Court imagined an Immigration Clause
that gave Congress “power to order at any time the deportation of aliens
whose presence in the country it deems hurtful.” 37 By the 1970s, Congress
routinely regulated immigrants in a manner untethered to any constitutional
power. For the Supreme Court, it became an uncontested premise that “[i]n
the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” 38
Today, judges and legal academics continue to debate the significance and
the merits of the Supreme Court’s “plenary power” doctrine. 39 Yet there has
long been a consensus that the doctrine began with the Chinese Exclusion
Case. 40 This consensus is mistaken: through the 1880s and 1890s, when the
Chinese Exclusion Case was decided, Congress and the Supreme Court consistently tied federal immigration laws to enumerated powers like the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. This mistaken
interpretation of the Chinese Exclusion Case has, in turn, produced two significant ongoing effects that plague judicial opinions and constitutional scholarship.
Part III of this Article deconstructs these two effects. First, the Chinese
Exclusion Case has inspired Congress and the courts to abandon both the enumerated powers and explicit constitutional limits contained in the text of the
Constitution—but only when Congress regulates immigrants. When Chief
Justice Marshall wrote in Gibbons that elections must provide the sole restraint on abusive legislation, he was proposing a weak theory of legislative

not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign
affairs of the nation.”).
37. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 280 (1922).
38. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Jenny-Brooke Condon, Equal Protection Exceptionalism, 69 RUTGERS U. L.
REV. 563, 575–76 (2017); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and
the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11 (1998); Stephen H. Legomsky,
Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 273;
David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 39
(2015); Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 858, 863 (1987); Schuck, supra note 2, at 24. For scholarship
denying the existence of the plenary power doctrine or its relationship to constitutional limits,
see, for example, Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and
Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 257, 258 (2000); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009-13: A New Era
of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 60–63 (2015); Martin, supra at 39.
40. See, e.g., ADAM B. COX & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, THE PRESIDENT AND
IMMIGRATION LAW 34 (2020); Cleveland, supra note 1, at 129–30; NEUMAN, supra note 18, at
122; see also Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 27 (2010); Amanda Frost, Independence and Immigration, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 485, 488 (2016); Lindsay, supra note 18, at 31, 47;
James A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L
L. 804, 823–29 (1983).
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constitutionalism. The strong version of this theory holds that in a representative democracy, it is up to voters and their elected representatives, not courts,
to determine how best to interpret and apply the Constitution. 41 In the 1880s,
the Court explicitly adopted the strong version of this theory when reviewing
federal legislation that regulated immigrants—leaving it up to Congress to determine the constitutional scope of federal law. 42
But at the same time that the Court reaffirmed this theory of legislative
constitutionalism when reviewing federal regulation of people who were disenfranchised, 43 the Court repudiated it when reviewing federal regulation of
white Americans. From the fall of Reconstruction to the rise of the Lochner
Era, the Court led a “counter-revolution of property,” during which it invented a host of new doctrines to prevent Congress from disrupting the autonomy of white people and capitalists who resided at the top of America’s
social hierarchy. 44 It held that Congress’s power to regulate commerce did not
include intrastate activities outside the “stream of commerce”; 45 that Congress’s power to enact civil rights legislation did not include the power to regulate white civilians; 46 and that Congress’s power to tax did not include the
power to tax the officers of states. 47 Many of these doctrines continue to animate the judicial review of federal legislation today, on the theory that the
Court must monitor the exercise of Congress’s enumerated powers and ensure
that all federal legislation is “necessary” and “proper” to the beneficial exercise
of an enumerated power. 48 Yet the Supreme Court has deployed the language
of “sovereignty” to avoid applying these same doctrines to Congress’s immigration laws. 49 And the result is that the Court skeptically scrutinizes laws that
interfere with wealthy, white, Christian voters while deferentially accepting
laws that interfere with disenfranchised people.
Second, and most notably, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
ever cogently explained the inconsistency between Congress’s power over immigrants and its power to regulate citizens and businesses. Over much of the
past century, a mere reference to the Chinese Exclusion Case has sufficed to
explain this anomaly, on the theory that the case establishes a “sovereign” immigration power disconnected from the Constitution’s text. But Justice Field’s

41. RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 4 (2007).
42. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604
(1889).
43. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (1901).
44. W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 476 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr.
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1935) (cleaned up).
45. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
46. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
47. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871), overruled in part by Graves v. New
York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
48. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 557–58 (2012).
49. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012).
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reference to “sovereignty” in the Chinese Exclusion Case cannot carry the
weight of this discrepancy. And despite the Court’s gestures to the contrary, 50
any connection between our immigration laws and Congress’s power to conduct foreign relations cannot justify Congress’s extraordinary power over immigrants living within the United States. 51
In Part IV, we argue for resolving this inconsistency in favor of legislative
constitutionalism. In contrast with most scholars and immigration advocates
who have sought to apply the Court’s ordinarily skeptical scrutiny to the immigration context, we argue that the history of federal immigration law highlights the promise of legislative solutions to the anomalies we identify. 52 Rather
than protecting disenfranchised immigrants from a hostile and overzealous
Congress, judicial review of Congress’s immigration law has functioned to entrench the plenary power doctrine, muffling the serious legislative debate that
animated the resistance to the Alien Friends Act and the first century of U.S.
immigration law. We therefore conclude that James Madison and other opponents of the first federal immigration restrictions were correct: only a “wave
of public opinion” can sweep out bad laws. 53 Rather than turn to the courts to
limit federal immigration laws just as they limit federal healthcare laws, we
argue that Congress itself should rethink the expanse of its immigration laws
in effect today. By treating immigration as a subject over which Congress has
the same power as it has over everything else—instead of as an extraordinary
exercise of sovereignty—we hope to disrupt the modern assumption, powerfully articulated by President Donald Trump, that “[a] nation without borders
is not a nation.” 54 In its place, we join Mae Ngai and other historians who have
sought to “detach sovereignty and its master, the nation-state, from their
claims of transcendence and to critique them as products of history.” 55
As a whole, this Article provides a critical legal history of a power that so
pervades the modern constitutional landscape that it is often assumed to be a
natural feature. 56 The goal of the Article is to denaturalize this power and to
explain, in the words of the intellectual historian Quentin Skinner, “how far

50. E.g., id. at 394–95.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 588–607.
52. See infra Section IV.A.
53. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Priestly, supra note 15, at 394; see also Madison, supra note 12, at 319; infra Section I.C. As Mark Tushnet has written of Thomas Jefferson’s
opposition to the Alien Friends Act of 1798, “Jefferson was a smart man and, for his times, a real
democrat. He did not place his hopes in the Supreme Court.” Mark Tushnet, Democracy Versus
Judicial Review, DISSENT, Spring 2005, at 59, 63.
54. Darren Samuelsohn & Michael Crowley, Trump: U.S. Can’t Guard Its Interests Abroad
If It Doesn’t ‘Protect Prosperity at Home,’ POLITICO (Dec. 18, 2017, 3:17 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/18/trump-foreign-policy-security-302242 [perma.cc/AR2M-V897].
55. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS 12 (new paperback ed. 2014).
56. See generally Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 100–16
(1984) (explaining how critical legal scholars have used descriptive historical accounts to disrupt
commonly held but ideologically inflected narratives about the origins of present-day doctrines).
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the values embodied in our present way of life, and our present ways of thinking about those values, reflect a series of choices made at different times between different possible worlds.” 57 As Skinner suggests, once we are equipped
with “a broader sense of possibility, we can stand back from the intellectual
commitments we have inherited and ask ourselves in a new spirit of enquiry
what we should think of them.” 58 In the same spirit, this Article contends that
Congress’s immigration power is less a product of principled constitutional
analysis than of intentional racism and an unintentional judicial game of telephone. And because its relationship to other legal and moral norms is contingent, the present generation has an obligation to imagine alternatives. 59
I.

THE IMMIGRATION CLAUSE BEFORE 1876

A. The Political Context of Congress’s First Immigration Law
In 1798, Moreau de St. Méry was astonished to learn that his name was
on a list of “dangerous” immigrants whom the federal government planned to
deport. 60 A refugee of the French Revolution, Moreau considered himself a
respectable member of Philadelphia society. 61 He ran a bookstore in what was
then the nation’s capital, distributing news and gossip to America’s growing
population of French émigrés. 62 He had even exchanged books with John Adams, who went on to become president of the United States. 63 Puzzled by his
inclusion on the list, Moreau dispatched a mutual friend to ask the president
what he had done to merit deportation. 64 “Nothing in particular,” President
Adams responded, “but he’s too French.” 65
Anti-French sentiment was an epidemic in 1798, one as pervasive as the
yellow fever that stalked America’s cities that summer. 66 Ever since the guillotine had debuted in Paris six years earlier, thousands of French people ducked
their heads into ships bound for America’s calmer shores. 67 But many Amer-

57. QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM 117 (Canto Classics ed. 2012).
58. Id.
59. See NGAI, supra note 55, at 12; JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION 3–4
(2018); RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED 516 (2011).
60. See MOREAU DE ST. MÉRY’S AMERICAN JOURNEY, 1793–1798, at 253 (Kenneth Roberts & Anna M. Roberts eds. & trans., 1947) [hereinafter MOREAU].
61. See id. at xvi–xviii.
62. SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS 866–67 (1989).
63. MOREAU, supra note 60, at 253.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Letter from Abigail Adams Smith to John Quincy Adams (Sept. 28, 1798), in 13
ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 243–45 (Sara Martin et al. eds., 2017); Letter from Abigail
Adams to Mary Smith Cranch (Apr. 26, 1798), in 12 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 529–33
(Sara Martin et al. eds., 2015).
67. See JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS 22–23 (1956).
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icans reacted to the influx with alarm, regarding France’s revolution as a pestilence that needed to be quarantined. 68 This alarm grew louder when enslaved
Africans in Saint-Domingue, the wealthiest colony in the world, liberated
themselves in the name of liberté, égalité, and fraternité. 69 It grew to a roar
when Napoleon Bonaparte’s armies and fleets carried La Marseillaise as far as
Egypt. 70 And it sounded like war drums after three French diplomats humiliated their American counterparts, turning one of them, John Marshall, into a
cause célèbre. 71 “People acted as though a French invasion force might land in
America at any moment,” Moreau later wrote in his diary. “Everybody was
suspicious of everybody else.” 72
Moreau found himself on a deportation list because leaders of the dominant Federalist Party warned that the American public “will think their present alarm is groundless, if Congress do not now take the lead of the People,
and . . . eradicate every species of foreign influence and domestic faction.”73
Francis Dana, the chief justice of Massachusetts’s highest court, spoke for
many Federalists when he asked President Adams, “Why are not the most decisive measures adopted by Congress for ridding our Country instantaneously
of all Aliens dangerous to its safety, especially all Frenchmen . . . ?” 74 A Philadelphia correspondent, sickened by the “French enemies in this city (daily eating the bread of our soil, and probably subsisting on the bounty of the state),”
similarly pleaded with Congress to “free our soil from the polluted foot-steps
of those base foreigners, and spurn from our bosoms the vipers we are cherishing!”75 Partisan columnists blended this Francophobia with a broader xenophobia, complaining that “these United States have become the resting place
of ninety-nine hundredths of the factious villains which Great Britain and Ireland have vomited from their shores.” 76 Inhaling this noxious atmosphere,
Senator Humphrey Marshall of Kentucky even published a poem, The Aliens,
68. See id.
69. Id.; see, e.g., DETECTION OF A CONSPIRACY FORMED BY THE UNITED IRISHMEN (May
1798), reprinted in 8 WILLIAM COBBETT, PORCUPINE’S WORKS, 199–200 (London, Cobbett &
Morgan 1801); THOMAS EVANS, AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF VIRGINIA 11–12 (Richmond,
Augustine Davis 1798). See generally C.L.R. JAMES, THE BLACK JACOBINS (Vintage Books ed.
1989) (discussing the Haitian Revolution).
70. See SMITH, supra note 67, at 5–8; see, e.g., DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF
VIRGINIA 20 (Richmond, Nicholson 1798) [hereinafter VIRGINIA DEBATES]; see also ANDREW
ROBERTS, NAPOLEON 151 (2014) (discussing the proposed invasion of Great Britain).
71. See SMITH, supra note 67, at 5–8.
72. MOREAU, supra note 60, at 252.
73. Letter from Francis Dana to John Adams (May 27, 1798), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-2508 [perma.cc/75B4-WNH6]; see
also SMITH, supra note 67, at 7–10; Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Jonathan Dayton (Mar.
15, 1798), in 27 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 14 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1987); Letter
from Alexander Hamilton to Jonathan Dayton (Mar. 30, 1798), supra, at 17.
74. Letter from Francis Dana to John Adams, supra note 73.
75. See AMERICANS, LOOK OUT!, PHILA. GAZETTE, Jun. 8, 1798, at 3.
76. DETECTION OF A CONSPIRACY FORMED BY THE UNITED IRISHMEN, supra note 69, at
223; see also Volney and Others, PORCUPINE’S GAZETTE, Jun. 22, 1798, at 2.
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in which he called for new laws to “make haste, and arrest” the “malignant”
stream pouring through America’s open doors. 77
Congress responded to this call to arms by passing four laws, two of which
quickly became the subject of a massive public outcry. One made it a federal
crime for anyone to slander the Adams Administration. 78 This new Sedition
Act gave the administration license to prosecute its political opponents despite
the First Amendment’s protection of a free press. The other controversial law
authorized the president “at any time . . . to order all such aliens as he shall
judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, . . . to depart out
of the territory of the United States.”79 This first federal immigration law became known as the Alien Friends Act after Congress passed another law, the
Alien Enemies Act, which authorized further actions against immigrants
whose home countries threatened to declare war against or invade the United
States. 80 Because France never actually came close to invading the United
States, President Adams invoked only the Alien Friends Act when he placed
Moreau’s name on a list of “dangerous” aliens.
The Alien Friends Act terrified French immigrants. Moreau’s family soon
joined a convoy of émigrés back to France. 81 Along with the Sedition Act, the
Alien Friends Act also enraged the opposition party in Congress: the Democratic-Republicans. “[T]he highly coloured dangers we have heard from the
residence of certain aliens among us, can be considered in no other light than
a[s] a cloak for the usurpation of a power not constitutionally belonging to
this government,” Senator Henry Tazewell of Virginia observed when he read
a draft of the Alien Friends Act in Congress. 82 James Madison called the Alien
Friends Act “a monster that must for ever disgrace its parents,” 83 while
Thomas Jefferson wrote that it “assumes powers over Alien-friends not delegated by the constitution [and] is not law, but is altogether void & of no
force.” 84 While the Democratic-Republicans opposed the Sedition Act as a violation of the First Amendment, their principal objection to the Alien Friends
Act was that Congress’s power to pass legislation was limited to the ends spec-

24).

77.
78.
79.
80.

See H. MARSHALL, THE ALIENS 11, 17 (Philadelphia 1798).
See Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, 596–97 (1798) (expired 1801).
Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798) (expired 1800).
Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–

81. MOREAU, supra note 60, at 255; see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(May 3, 1798), in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 322 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003); Communication, AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER, June 16, 1798, at 3.
82. Federal Legislature, supra note 14, at 2.
83. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 20, 1798), supra note 81, at
358, 359.
84. Jefferson’s Draft (Oct. 4, 1798), supra note 81, at 536, 537.
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ified in the Constitution. Yet nothing in the Constitution “authorized Congress to prohibit the migration of foreigners to any state, nor to banish them
when admitted.” 85
B. The Federalist Defense of Congress’s Power to Deport
Federalist politicians in Congress canvassed the Constitution in search of
a source for Congress’s power to deport “alien friends” like Moreau. For the
most part, they were happy to concede that Congress could pass only those
laws authorized by the Constitution’s specific clauses. But one of those clauses,
the Necessary and Proper Clause, authorized Congress to “make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.” 86 Federalists like Alexander Hamilton had spent the previous decade refining their
interpretation of this clause into an expansive source of implied powers, one
that authorized Congress to read the Constitution’s other enumerated powers
generously. Hamilton’s successful defense of Congress’s implied power to
charter a bank in 1791 had since become a Federalist mantra: “[i]f the end be
clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, & if the measure
have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular
provision of the constitution—it may safely be deemed to come within the
compass of the national authority.” 87
Invoking Hamilton’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
Federalists in 1798 contended that a deportation law was constitutional so
long as it could be understood as a reasonable means of accomplishing one of
the Constitution’s specified ends. 88 “[W]e must examine the whole paper, we
must examine it fairly, but liberally,” a prominent group of Virginia Federalists wrote of the Constitution’s text, as they warned readers not to expect any
explicit authorization of Congress’s deportation power. 89 “It is necessary, in

85. Federal Legislature, supra note 14, at 2.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
87. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act
to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 97–134
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965). For the pervasiveness of this argument, see 12 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 519–20 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 2012).
88. See, e.g., 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Washington, 1836) [hereinafter
ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (resolution of the Massachusetts legislature); 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2986
(1799) (report of the House Select Comm. on the Alien Friends Act); VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra
note 70, at 15 (statement of Del. George K. Taylor).
89. See THE ADDRESS OF THE MINORITY IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE TO THE PEOPLE
OF THAT STATE 7 (1799) [hereinafter MINORITY ADDRESS]. For a persuasive attribution of the
address’s authorship to Henry Lee, see 12 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 87, at
515. For an example of the address’s prominence and wide distribution, see Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Alexander Hamilton (Feb. 7, 1799), in 22 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 469, 469–72 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1975) (mistakenly attributing the address to the
future Chief Justice John Marshall).
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pursuing this enquiry, to bear in mind that we are investigating a constitution
which must unavoidably be restricted in various points to general expressions,
making the great outlines of a subject, and not a law which is capable of descending to every minute detail.” 90 Soon enough, this approach would become
the undisputed method of interpreting all of Congress’s constitutional powers. 91 But finding a clause that could be read “fairly, but liberally” 92 to justify
the Alien Friends Act proved tricky.
1.

The War Clauses

Pointing to Napoleon’s ongoing invasion of Egypt, the Federalists primarily defended Congress’s deportation power with the arsenal of constitutional
provisions that permitted Congress to protect the nation. Article I of the Constitution empowered Congress to “declare War,” to “raise and support Armies,” and to “provide for calling forth the Militia to . . . suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions,” 93 while Article IV empowered the federal
government to “protect each [State] against Invasion.” 94 Members of both
parties agreed that these clauses collectively empowered Congress to authorize
the bombardment of French soldiers in battle. 95 Federalists therefore considered it “absurd . . . [t]hat Congress may make war, but cannot do a less hostile
act,” 96 such as preventing “the migration of a French army” or deporting
French partisans before a war began. 97 “[T]hough there is no express authority
to this effect, it is one of those things which is too evident to be doubted,”
explained Representative Otis of Massachusetts. “[A]n army of soldiers would
not be so dangerous to the country, as an army of spies and incendiaries scattered through the Continent.” 98
This sentiment offered a compelling justification for the Alien Enemies
Act, which allowed the president to deport citizens of any country that threatened to invade the United States. But the Alien Friends Act applied to any
immigrant at any time, even when no war or invasion was being contemplated. 99 Democratic-Republicans stressed this distinction: it was only “[w]ith
respect to aliens, who are not enemies, but members of nations in peace and
amity with the United States, [that] the power assumed by the act of Congress,
is denied to be constitutional,” explained James Madison. 100 Virginia legislator

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

MINORITY ADDRESS, supra note 89, at 7.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 421 (1819).
MINORITY ADDRESS, supra note 89, at 7.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–15.
Id. art. IV, § 4.
See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1980 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin).
Id. at 1984 (statement of Rep. William Gordon).
Id. at 1960–61 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis).
Id. at 1961.
9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2995 (1799) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin).
Madison, supra note 12, at 318.
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Thomas Barbour added that if “no other reason could be assigned in favor of
the alien [friends] law, than an idea so wild as the danger of admitting Buonaparte & his army, its supporters must be in pitiful distress.” 101
Acknowledging the force of these criticisms, Federalists supplemented
their position with more tenuous explanations for why Congress could treat
peacetime immigrants as the equivalent of a wartime danger. Attorney General Lee spoke for many when he defended the Act as necessary to protect the
nation from the “great number of alien Frenchmen dispersed in various parts
of the United States”—twenty thousand according to his estimates—who were
“capable of bearing arms . . . , employed to send intelligence of what was passing in our country . . . , [and] ready to join the French standard, whenever it
should be erected on our land.” 102 Northern Federalists joined him in spreading rumors that “Frenchmen, and their friends among us,” were planning to
burn American cities and “raise the exotic French interests on the ruins of
America.” 103 Southern Federalists went even further in this direction, treating
the Act as “particularly calculated for the protection of the southern states”
because French immigrants would otherwise initiate a Haitian Revolution on
American soil. 104 George K. Taylor, a Virginia legislator who President Adams
would soon appoint as a federal judge, 105 described the “devastation and carnage [that] had been exhibited by Frenchmen in their own Island of Saint Domingo.” 106 He said similar attempts “had been already made, by French
emigrants, to excite our slaves to insurrection.” 107 Taylor dramatically imagined Virginian “wives and daughters torn from their [family’s] arms, with naked bosoms, out-stretched hands and disheveled hair, to gratify the brutal
passion of a ruthless negro.” 108 He then asked “how all that was to be prevented? By vesting the general government with that power to remove such
Aliens.” 109
Connecting all these threats back to Congress’s power to “protect each
state from invasion,” Attorney General Lee cited the voluntary departure of
immigrants like Moreau de St. Méry as evidence that the Alien Friends Act
was already working to make a French invasion less likely. 110 “The probability
of an invasion from [F]rance may be rated by the probability of the invaders
receiving effectual aid and support in our country from Aliens and disaffected

101. VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra note 70, at 53.
102. CHARLES LEE, DEFENCE OF THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS 6 (Philadelphia, John
Ward Fenno 1798); see, e.g., The Alien Bill, PORCUPINE’S GAZETTE, June 23, 1798, at 3.
103. Capt. Duplex, PHILA. GAZETTE, Aug. 4, 1798, at 3.
104. VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra note 70, at 22 (statement of Del. George K. Taylor).
105. 2 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 560 n.2 (1916).
106. VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra note 70, at 21.
107. Id. at 22.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. LEE, supra note 102, at 7.
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citizens,” he reasoned. 111 “So long as France shall be without reasonable hope
of such support so long will it defer an invasion and no longer.” 112 Lee and
other Federalists interpreted the War Clauses as if they permitted Congress
“to take all reasonable measures with Aliens that tend to prevent an invasion”—even if the effect of such measures was to make an already remote
threat marginally less likely. 113 “Invasion actually made is to be repelled, and
for that purpose militia may be called out. But congress is to do more than
merely to repel the actual invasion,” wrote Virginia’s Federalist state legislators. 114 “To protect against an evil, includes the right of taking proper and necessary steps for its prevention. Of these proper and necessary steps, the
government possessed of the power must judge.” 115 Massachusetts’s legislature agreed. “It cannot be seriously believed that the United States should have
waited till the poniard had in fact been plunged,” it resolved. 116
2.

Other Clauses

Nearly every other defense of Congress’s power to deport immigrants followed from the premise that the Constitution empowered Congress to “adopt
any measures of prevention and precaution short of war.” 117 The most frequently cited example of Congress’s preventative power was the clause of Article I that empowered Congress to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal”: a
form of diplomatic retaliation that authorized American ships to capture and
seize foreign vessels. 118 “To make reprisals is a power distinct from, and which
not unfrequently precedes war,” the Virginia Federalists wrote, adding that
“reprisals may be made on the persons as well as the property of aliens.” 119 The
Virginians therefore reasoned that “the removal of aliens [may] be considered
as the exercise, in an inferior degree, of the general power of reprisal on persons.” 120
With similar creativity, the Federalists invoked a reserve of other constitutional provisions that merely gestured toward national security. These included the Preamble’s declaration that the Constitution was intended to

111. Letter from Charles Lee to John Adams (Nov. 1, 1798), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-3190 [perma.cc/TKT2-MNVA].
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. MINORITY ADDRESS, supra note 89, at 8.
115. Id.
116. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 88, at 535.
117. EVANS, supra note 69, at 18.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see WILLIAM J. RICH, 3 MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 34:6 (3d ed. 2011).
119. MINORITY ADDRESS, supra note 89, at 7.
120. Id.; see also, e.g., EVANS, supra note 69, at 18–19.
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“provide for the common defence”; 121 Article II’s statement that “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy”; 122 and a clause of
Article I that empowered Congress to “define and punish . . . Offences against
the Law of Nations.”123 The last of these clauses allegedly authorized Congress
to punish the international offense of living in a foreign country while conspiring “against the peace of the nation.” 124 But because Article III and the
Sixth Amendment each prohibited Congress from punishing an offense absent an indictment and jury trial—which the Alien Friends Act did not provide for 125—Federalists were as likely to invoke this clause as to retreat from
it. A House select committee illustrated its uncertainty about the clause’s applicability when it resolved that “the removal of aliens, though it may be inconvenient to them, cannot be considered as a punishment inflicted for an
offence,” because an “alien may be removed without having committed any
offence, merely from motives of policy or security.” 126
3.

Structural Arguments

Turning beyond the text of Article I, Federalists seeking to defend the Alien Friends Act invoked The Law of Nations, a book by the eminent Swiss lawyer Emer de Vattel. First published in America two years earlier, the book was
a descriptive account of the customs and expectations of eighteenth-century
international law. 127 Vattel approvingly described a world of open borders,
and he urged his readers to be hospitable to migrants. But Federalist politicians selectively excerpted passages describing the “sovereign” powers of exclusion and deportation to reinforce their interpretation of the Constitution’s
War Clauses.
Considered as a whole, Vattel’s book was singularly unhelpful for a group
of politicians seeking to hound French immigrants out of their country. Defining a sovereign as the supreme “political authority” that the people of each
nation established “to order and direct what ought to be done,” 128 Vattel wrote
that all sovereigns had a general duty to provide asylum to all migrants who
wished to settle in the sovereign’s land. 129 Vattel added that all sovereigns had

121. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see, e.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 88, at 536 (resolution of
the Massachusetts legislature); VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra note 70, at 15 (statement of Del. George
K. Taylor).
122. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1; see, e.g., EVANS, supra note 69, at 17.
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
124. VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra note 70, at 16 (statement of Del. George K. Taylor).
125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat.
570, 571 (1798) (expired 1800).
126. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2987 (1799).
127. M. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (New York, Samuel Campbell 1796) (1758).
128. Id. at 59; see also id. at 59–60.
129. See id. at 169, 245, 249.
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a related duty to treat resident foreigners equally under the same legal protections that applied to citizens. 130 Recognizing that almost every sovereign in the
world acknowledged these duties “to allow a free passage through, and residence in his state,” Vattel encouraged all sovereigns to “give the kindest reception to foreigners, receive them with politeness, and on every occasion
shew a disposition to serve them.” 131 Almost teasingly he added, “No nation
is in this respect more worthy of praise than the French.” 132
Needless to say, these were not the passages that interested the Federalists.
Instead, the Federalists emphasized an extraordinary circumstance when even
Vattel admitted that the duties of free passage and residence did not apply:
when the duties conflicted with a sovereign’s “right of security,” or its “natural,
and indispensable obligation” to preserve its citizens from injury. 133 Vattel explained that if a sovereign had “particular and important reasons” why the
residence of certain foreigners would compromise its own ability to guarantee
its citizens’ security, then a sovereign could, consistent with international law,
forbid the entry of foreigners or “adopt, on their admission, every precaution
that prudence can dictate.” 134 He illustrated the point with examples of ethical
exclusions. “Thus a nation, whose lands are scarcely sufficient to supply the
wants of the citizens, is not obliged to receive into its territories a company of
fugitives or exiles. Thus it ought even absolutely to reject them, if they are infected with a contagious disease,” he wrote. “Thus also it has a right to send
them elsewhere, if it has just cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners
of the citizens, that they will create religious disturbances, or occasion any
other disorder, contrary to the public safety.” 135 But Vattel reiterated that a
sovereign needed “particular and substantial reasons” before it could “refuse
even a perpetual residence to a man driven from his country. . . . [Its] prudence should be free from unnecessary suspicion and jealousy;—it should not
be carried so far as to refuse a retreat to the unfortunate, for slight reasons,
and on groundless and frivolous fears.” 136
The defenders of the Alien Friends Act seized on Vattel’s description of
national security as an “indispensable obligation.” 137 They reasoned that because the United States was “a sovereign and independent nation,” something
in the Constitution necessarily gave the federal government power to deport

130. Id. at 236–37. Vattel was not alone. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *360–62 (discussing limited exceptions for inheriting property and holding office).
131. VATTEL, supra note 127, at 171, 251.
132. Id. at 251.
133. Id. at 216.
134. Id. at 169–70, 184–85.
135. Id. at 108; see also id. at 174 (authorizing the detention of foreigners “in war time”).
136. Id. at 107–08; see also id. at 180 (“very important reasons”).
137. EVANS, supra note 69, at 18.
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foreigners whose ideologies were both contagious and dangerous to the nation’s security. 138
Attorney General Lee illustrated the logical chain that connected Vattel’s
sovereign power of deportation with the Federalist interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause and War Clauses. 139 “The[re] can be no complete
sovereignty without the power of removing aliens; and the exercise of such a
power is inseparably incident to the nation,” Lee wrote. 140 “If the terms of the
constitution were less explicit than we find them in granting to Congress the
power ‘to protect each of the states from invasion,’ on this principle it might
reasonably be contended that the power was invested in Congress to remove
aliens.” 141 Lee insisted, however, that he was not arguing that Vattel’s nationalsecurity principle gave the United States a freestanding sovereign power to
remove aliens. Instead, Vattel’s principle confirmed for Lee that deportation
was a necessary and proper means of executing the protect-from-invasion language of Article IV. 142
The most xenophobic Federalists took Lee’s structural argument one step
further, contending that because the states were individually incapable of protecting the nation from dangerous immigrants, necessity dictated that Congress have a deportation power regardless of what the Constitution said. 143 “It
is only necessary to ask whether, without such a power vested in some department, any government ever did, or ever can, long protect itself,” wrote Secretary of State Pickering, the member of the Adams Administration charged
with enforcing the Alien Friends Act. 144 Pickering and other advocates of mass
deportation suggested that the Constitution limited Congress’s powers only
when Congress legislated with respect to citizens—not when it passed laws
that applied only to immigrants. 145 “It is absurd to say that in providing by law
for their removal, the constitution is violated,” Pickering wrote in a widely
published open letter, “for he must be ignorant indeed who does not know
that the constitution was established for the protection and security of American citizens, and not of intriguing foreigners.” 146

138. Id. at 14; see also, e.g., 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2986 (1799); The Sedition Act Vindicated,
RUSSELL’S GAZETTE, Dec. 13, 1798, at 1, 2; LEE, supra note 102, at 5; see also VIRGINIA DEBATES,
supra note 70, at 13–14, 17, 146 (statement of Del. George K. Taylor).
139. LEE, supra note 102, at 5, 8.
140. Id. at 8–9.
141. Id. at 9.
142. See id.
143. See 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2986–87 (1799).
144. See Letter from Timothy Pickering to P. Johnson, Esquire (Sept. 29, 1798), in DAILY
ADVERTISER, Oct. 12, 1798; James Morton Smith, The Enforcement of the Alien Friends Act of
1798, 41 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 85, 90–91 (1954).
145. See Letter from Timothy Pickering to P. Johnson, supra note 144, at 2; see also 9
ANNALS OF CONG. 2987 (1799).
146. Letter from Timothy Picketing to P. Johnson, supra note 144; see also VIRGINIA
DEBATES, supra note 70, at 106–07 (statement of Del. Cowan).
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C. The Democratic-Republican Opposition to Congress’s Power to Deport
Democratic-Republicans challenged the constitutionality of the Alien
Friends Act as soon as the bill was introduced in Congress. Senator Tazewell
of Virginia and Representative Gallatin of Pennsylvania—a naturalized citizen
with a French accent—led the opposition. 147 Their basic argument was that
the Act was “neither among the specific powers granted by the Constitution
to the General Government, nor necessary to carry into effect any of those
specific powers.” 148 Where many Federalists invoked the Necessary and
Proper Clause as a general source of implied power, Gallatin stressed that the
words “necessary and proper” had to require at least some reasonable connection to an enumerated power, or else Congress would have the “undefined
discretion” to invoke even the most unrelated enumerated power in support
of any law. 149 “[L]et gentlemen remember,” Gallatin implored his colleagues,
“that it is necessary not only to assert in a vague manner that the authority
contended for may be derived from some specific power.” 150 One must also
“prove that, in the words of the Constitution, the present law is necessary and
proper for carrying into effect some one specific power expressly given by the
Constitution.” 151 Proceeding through the specific powers invoked by the Federalists, he concluded that the Act could be justified not “by any positive rule
laid down by their charter,” but only by “suspicions, alarms, popular clamor,
private ambition, and by the views of fluctuating factions.” 152
1.

The War Clauses

As passionately as the Federalists insisted that the Alien Friends Act was
a necessary and proper prewar measure to “protect States against an invasion,”
the Democratic-Republicans responded that the Act’s connection to foreign
hostilities was too attenuated to qualify as an exercise of Congress’s war powers. 153 In contrast with the Alien Enemies Act, which applied whenever “any
invasion or predatory incursion shall be perpetrated, attempted, or threatened
against the territory of the United States,” 154 the Alien Friends Act applied “at
any time,” 155 including before any invasion was threatened and after “the
alarms on that subject [were] to be completely at an end.” 156 The Democratic147. See Federal Legislature, supra note 14; Douglas Bradburn, A Clamor in the Public
Mind: The Opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts, 65 WM. & MARY Q. 565, 572 (2008).
148. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2993 (1799).
149. Id. at 2995–96.
150. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1974 (1798).
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2996 (1799).
153. Id. at 2995.
154. Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577, 577 (1798) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 21–24); see, e.g., Madison, supra note 12, at 318.
155. Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798) (expired 1800).
156. See Madison, supra note 12, at 318; 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2995 (1799).
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Republicans maintained that the Alien Friends Act was therefore unconstitutional to the extent it applied in situations where the Alien Enemies Act did
not. 157 As Gallatin put the point, their argument was against the Act “which
authorizes the President to remove . . . subjects of a nation which is not at war
with the United States, and which has not perpetrated, attempted, or threatened any invasion or predatory incursion against the territory of the United
States.” 158
Gallatin, Madison and other Democratic-Republicans also stridently attacked the Federalist position that Congress had to have the power not only
to respond to a threatened invasion but also to “prevent an invasion.” 159 On a
factual level, they regarded the Federalist fearmongering about a French invasion as “the visionary phantoms of a disordered imagination.” 160 And even if
French immigrants were up to no good, Gallatin observed that the Act applied
broadly “against Irish emigrants and other subjects of Great Britain.” 161 He
therefore concluded that the Federalists were acting “under pretence of preventing imaginary evils, . . . to introduce doctrines and innovations which
would hereafter serve as a precedent to attack the liberties of the citizens themselves.” 162
On a legal level, the Democratic-Republicans added that even if the evils
apprehended by the Federalists were real, the Federalist claim of a power to
prevent invasions relied on a logical fallacy that would “establish the omnipotence of Congress, and substantial despotism, on the ruins of our Constitution.” 163 As Madison explained, the Federalist position was “that a power to
act on a case when it actually occurs, includes a power over all the means that
may tend to prevent the occurrence of the case.” 164 But, Madison insisted,
“[s]uch a latitude of construction would render unavailing, every practicable
definition of particular and limited powers.” 165 For example, if the Necessary
and Proper Clause gave Congress a power to prevent war, then Congress could
take virtually any action in the name of national security, including the “indiscriminate removal of all aliens.” 166 Madison and other Democratic-Republicans thought it “preposterous” that the War Clauses gave Congress such
unlimited power. 167

157. See, e.g., ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A LETTER TO A MEMBER OF CONGRESS 8 (1799); see also
Federal Legislature, supra note 14, at 2.
158. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2993 (1799) (internal quotations omitted).
159. Letter from Charles Lee to John Adams, supra note 111 (emphasis added); see supra
text accompanying notes 110–115.
160. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 3000–01 (1799).
161. Id. at 3001.
162. Id. at 3001–02.
163. Id. at 3001.
164. Madison, supra note 12, at 322.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 322–23.
167. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2994 (1799).

May 2022]

The Imaginary Immigration Clause
2.

1441

Other Clauses

The Democratic-Republicans also dismissed the relevance of two clauses
that the Federalists rarely invoked but which would later become central to
the federal government’s immigration power: the Naturalization Clause,
which permitted Congress to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” 168
and the Commerce Clause, which permitted Congress to “regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations.” 169 The Naturalization Clause, Senator Tazewell observed, “at most could only authorize Congress to give or withhold the right
of citizenship.” 170 Other Democratic-Republicans agreed, distinguishing naturalization, or the power to make someone a citizen, from denization, or the
power to allow someone to reside in a particular territory. 171 “[A]lthough the
individual states might, . . . have been willing to give up to congress the power
of naturalization, it would have been very dangerous and impolitic to put it in
the power of a majority of the states in the union, to prohibit emigration to
the other states,” wrote George Nicholas, the first attorney general of Kentucky. 172 Turning the Federalists’ sovereignty argument on its head, he observed that “each state, as a sovereign and independent state, had an
unquestionable right to declare, on what terms strangers should be permitted
to come into the state, and what privileges they should be entitled to after they
had emigrated to the state.” 173
The Democratic-Republicans considered the Commerce Clause an even
more laughable ground on which to base the Alien Friends Act. The power to
deport immigrants, explained Representative Gallatin, “cannot by any one be
considered as a commercial regulation.” 174 Gallatin added that even a commercial regulation of immigration would conflict with Article I, Section 9,
which prohibited Congress from regulating the “migration or importation of
such persons as any of the States shall think proper to admit . . . prior to the
year 1808.” 175 The Federalists stridently argued that Section 9’s prohibition
applied only to the slave trade and had nothing to do with “sending off, after
their arrival, such emigrants . . . [found to be] dangerous to the peace or safety
of the country.”176 But Gallatin cited the Federalists’ distinction of importation
from deportation as further evidence that “there does not exist any power
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
169. Id. cl. 3.
170. Federal Legislature, supra note 14, at 2.
171. GEORGE NICHOLAS, A LETTER FROM GEORGE NICHOLAS, OF KENTUCKY, TO HIS
FRIEND, IN VIRGINIA 9 (Philadelphia, James Carey 1799).
172. Id. at 8–9.
173. Id. at 7. For more arguments on these lines, see, for example, Federal Legislature, supra
note 14, at 2. For arguments taking the other side, see, for example, TUCKER, supra note 157, at
16–17; Madison, supra note 12, at 319–20; THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
174. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1974 (1798).
175. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2986–87 (1799).
176. Id. at 2986–87 (report of the H. Select Comm. on the Alien Friends Act); see also
MINORITY ADDRESS, supra note 89, at 8–9.
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granted to the General Government by the Constitution which can rationally
serve as a pretence to claim an authority to remove emigrants generally.” 177
3.

Structural Arguments

The Democratic-Republicans finally responded to the idea broached by
several Federalists that Congress could pass any law that was a necessary and
proper incident of “sovereignty” as opposed to an enumerated power. Writing
that he could not “pass by so portentous a claim” without noticing “the fatal
tendencies with which it would be pregnant,” Madison and other opponents
of the Alien Friends Act offered two arguments in response. 178
First, they contended that such an idea was inconsistent with “the idea of
limiting a government by constitutional rules.” 179 “By the constitution of the
United States, the people of America intended to erect for themselves a general
government over the union, with defined and limited powers,” the residents
of New York’s Suffolk County explained in a petition. “They did not conceive
it consistent with their political happiness, and the preservation of their liberties, that this general government should legislate in every possible case, and
on every possible subject as it might judge most expedient.” 180 So while the
Constitution vested Congress with certain “sovereign” powers—including the
powers to declare war and naturalize citizens—it necessarily withheld other
powers ordinarily possessed by sovereigns, such as the power to enact ex post
facto laws. 181 It was therefore insufficient for the Federalists to contend that
Great Britain and other sovereigns all had the power to deport immigrants.
Second, they observed that even if the power to deport immigrants were
an inherent attribute of sovereignty, it did not follow that Congress was sovereign in this respect. 182 Since the revolution of 1776, it had become a maxim
among American intellectuals that sovereignty was lodged not in Parliament,
Congress, or any other supreme legislature, but in the people whose consent
was necessary for those legislatures to function. 183 As St. George Tucker explained, “the federal government of the United States, is that portion, only, of
the sovereign power, which is by the constitution entrusted to the public functionaries, who are to administer it, as the agents and servants of the people.” 184
In other words, while it might be necessary and proper for Congress to execute
the sovereign powers actually delegated to it by the Constitution, all other sovereign powers were reserved to the states or to the people—as was evident
from the Tenth Amendment. Gallatin reminded his colleagues of the many

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2998 (1799) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin).
Madison, supra note 12, at 324.
VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra note 70, at 130.
Memorial, AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER, Jan. 30, 1799, at 3.
VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra note 70, at 129–130; Madison, supra note 12, at 323.
Federal Legislature, supra note 14, at 2.
See TUCKER, supra note 157, at 2.
Id. (cleaned up).
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state immigration laws still in effect. 185 So even if the sovereign nation possessed “the power of removing aliens,” such a power was not “one of those
granted by the nation to the General Government,” but rather “intrusted by
the nation to the Governments of the individual States respectively.” 186
Third, and finally, the Democratic-Republicans took issue with the claim
that whatever limits applied to Congress with respect to citizens did not apply
when Congress legislated as a sovereign with respect to foreigners. 187 Thomas
Jefferson dismissed this distinction as something of a Trojan horse, writing
that “the friendless alien has indeed been selected as the safest subject of a first
experiment; but the citizen will soon follow.” 188 Madison and other Democratic-Republicans took the argument seriously enough to respond with a
broad claim that Congress was subject to the same constitutional rules no matter who was the subject of its legislation. 189 The Fifth Amendment, for instance, prohibited Congress from depriving any “person,” not just any citizen,
of their right to life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 190 For
Madison, this meant that the federal government could not arrest an immigrant unless “some probable ground of suspicion be exhibited before some
judicial authority; . . . the party may avoid being thrown into confinement, by
finding pledges or sureties for his legal conduct sufficient in the judgment of
some judicial authority,” and “he may have the benefit of a writ of habeas corpus, and thus obtain his release, if wrongfully confined.” 191 Similarly, a group
of Democratic-Republican legislators in Pennsylvania objected that under the
Alien Friends Act, an immigrant “may have invested his whole property in the
lands and funds of this country, married himself or children into American
families, or fled hither from civil or religious oppression, and yet, at the pleasure of ONE MAN, thus unprotected, may be banished without the privilege
of a jury trial.” 192 Madison added that such an outcome violated the Sixth
Amendment: “if a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and among
the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the
name can be applied.” 193 Moreover, Madison observed, if Congress could pass
any law with respect to immigrants, then immigrants “might not only be banished, but even capitally punished, without a jury or the other incidents to a

185. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1983 (1798).
186. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2994, 2999 (1799); see also VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra note 70, at
74 (statement of Del. Foushee).
187. See, e.g., Federal Legislature, supra note 14, at 2; VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra note 70, at
49 (statement of Del. Barbour).
188. Jefferson’s Draft, supra note 84, at 540.
189. See Extracts from the Address to the People (Jan. 23, 1799), supra note 88, at 531.
190. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see TUCKER, supra note 157, at 19.
191. Madison, supra note 12, at 318.
192. Nathan Boileau et al., Dissent: On Address to the President, CARLISLE GAZETTE, Feb.
6, 1799, at 2.
193. See Madison, supra note 12, at 319.
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fair trial.” 194 Calling such an outcome absurd, Madison concluded that “although aliens are not parties to the constitution, it does not follow that the
constitution has vested in Congress an absolute power over them.” 195
D. Aftermath of the Alien Friends Act
In the end, even though congressional opponents of the Alien Friends Act
were unable to stop the bill’s passage, they were quickly joined by legions of
farmers, immigrants, and county lawyers who used the guerilla tactics of popular constitutionalism to undermine the Act’s perceived legitimacy. 196 While
Attorney General Lee and Secretary Pickering entrenched themselves behind
sophisticated legal defenses, this popular front spent the summer of 1798
erecting liberty poles and drafting petitions that bluntly quoted the Constitution. 197 “To the text then of the constitution we appeal,” petitioned the residents of Albemarle County, Virginia, after a fractious day of discussing the
Alien Friends Act and its equally despised companion legislation, the Sedition
Act, which banned publications that defamed the Adams Administration. 198
“[I]n all [the Constitution’s] parts we have examined it: in none do we read
the delegation of an authority competent to the enaction of either of those
laws.” 199
These popular demonstrations reflected the political culture of early
America, in which constitutional debates were resolved not by courts but by
public opinion. 200 They gave power and a forum to Jefferson and Madison’s
legal objections that the Act “assum[ed] power over alien friends not delegated
by the Constitution.” 201 Together, they refined the growing movement against
the Alien and Sedition Acts into a trenchant constitutional challenge that persuaded voters to support their party in the 1800 elections. 202
Alexander Hamilton played little part in the debate over the Alien Friends
Act, and he ultimately advocated for strict enforcement of the law. But as he
read the Democratic-Republicans’ legal arguments and listened to the public
outcry, he nonetheless wondered whether “laws of this kind passed merely to

Id. at 320.
Id.
See Bradburn, supra note 147, at 567–72; LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES 4–7 (2004).
197. Bradburn, supra note 147, at 567–78.
198. Id. at 569–71; To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States,
UNIVERSAL GAZETTE, Nov. 1, 1798, at 4.
199. To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, supra note 198, at 4;
see also, e.g., Virginia, AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER, Nov. 20, 1798, at 2–3.
200. See Bradburn, supra note 147, at 590–91.
201. Resolutions Adopted by the Kentucky General Assembly (Nov. 10, 1798), supra note
81, at 550, 550–56.
202. See Bradburn, supra note 147, at 594.
194.
195.
196.

May 2022]

The Imaginary Immigration Clause

1445

excite odium and remain a dead letter.” 203 Indeed, the opposition to the Alien
Friends Act helped inspire a “mighty wave of public opinion” that crushed the
Federalist Party in the 1800 elections. 204 The victorious new president,
Thomas Jefferson, soon promised French émigrés that the federal government
would never engage in similar behavior again. 205 “[I]t is with heartfelt satisfaction that, in the first moment of my public action, I can hail you with welcome
to our land . . . and disclaim the legitimacy of that libel on legislation which
under the form of a law was for sometime placed among them,” he wrote in
1801. 206
Jefferson’s party would not entirely uphold this promise. Although the
Alien Friends Act expired in disgrace, the Alien Enemies Act survived unscathed. When the War of 1812 began during James Madison’s presidency, he
enforced the Alien Enemies Act by requiring all British subjects in America to
register with federal officials and relocate away from the eastern seaboard. 207
An incredulous John Adams scoffed at Madison’s apparent hypocrisy, but the
Democratic-Republicans maintained that they always believed that Congress’s powers to wage a declared war were far broader than its powers merely
to prevent an invasion. 208 Applying similar logic, future Congresses and presidents would exercise an implied “power to wage war successfully” by registering, relocating, detaining, and deporting citizens and immigrants alike,
most notably with U.S. citizens of Japanese descent during World War II. 209
The Democratic-Republicans would also enact their own federal legislation regulating the movement of people. For example, as the year 1808 approached during Jefferson’s second term, Congress enacted a bill to abolish
the transatlantic slave trade. The year was constitutionally significant: Article
I, Section 9 temporarily barred Congress from prohibiting “[t]he Migration or
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit . . . prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and
203. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Jonathan Dayton (1799), in 23 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 599, 604 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1987).
204. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Priestly, supra note 15, at 394–95.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 393–94.
207. See Lockington v. Smith, 15 F. Cas. 758 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 8,448); In re Lockington, 5 AM. L.J. 92 (Pa. 1813).
208. See supra text accompanying note 159; Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson
(June 14, 1813), in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, RETIREMENT SERIES 191, 191–93 (J.
Jefferson Looney ed., 2009).
209. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (relocation of U.S.
citizens); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (juryless tribunal of German saboteurs). This war
power has since been expanded to apply during undeclared wars and “is not exhausted when the
shooting stops.” Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 167–68 (1948) (citing United States v. Anderson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 56, 70 (1869); The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700 (1871); McElrath
v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 438 (1880); Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251
U.S. 146, 167 (1919)) (deportation of German national after World War II); see Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (detention of U.S. citizens during undeclared War on Terror).
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eight.” 210 This language strongly implied that something in the Constitution
permitted Congress to suppress the transatlantic slave trade after 1808. But in
light of the party’s arguments against the Alien Friends Act a decade earlier,
Democratic-Republicans thought it important to be precise about which
clause in the Constitution empowered them to regulate the importation of enslaved people.
Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” was an
appealing candidate. 211 But just as Gallatin had disparaged the idea that the
Commerce Clause permitted Congress to deport people in 1798, 212 a House
committee in 1807 feared that relying on the Commerce Clause would “sanction the principle that it was lawful for Congress to deal in human beings as
an article of commerce—a principle abhorrent to humanity, and at war with
our fundamental institutions.” 213 Ultimately, the supporters of the bill invoked the clause that permitted Congress to “define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.” 214 The final series of acts declared that anyone convicted of participating in the transatlantic slave trade would be “adjudged a pirate” and punished
for committing an offence against the law of nations. 215
Congress’s specificity about the source of its power to abolish the transatlantic slave trade illustrates how, like scar tissue, memories of the Alien
Friends Act limited how flexibly subsequent Congresses exercised federal
power. Over the next century, the defunct Alien Friends Act would be remembered as “a flagrant violation of the Constitution;” 216 an “insidious attack upon
the freedom of the person”; 217 an “inva[sion of] the political rights and powers
of the States”; 218 and a product of “that ‘reign of terror,’ which stands recorded,
in such dark characters, upon the pages of our history.” 219

210. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
211. Id. § 8, cl. 3.
212. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
213. 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 271 (1807).
214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 271 (1807).
215. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 63, §§ 4–5, 3 Stat. 600, 601; see also Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch.
22, 2 Stat. 426; Gabriel J. Chin & Paul Finkelman, Birthright Citizenship, Slave Trade Legislation,
and the Origins of Federal Immigration Regulation, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2215, 2227–50 (2021)
(discussing prosecutions under these Acts).
216. 3 REG. DEB. 1269 (1827) (statement of Rep. William C. Rives).
217. 25 ANNALS OF CONG. 664 (1813) (statement of Speaker Henry Clay).
218. 9 REG. DEB. 288 (1833) (statement of Sen. George M. Bibb).
219. 3 REG. DEB. 1268 (1827) (statement of Rep. William C. Rives); see also, e.g., Smith v.
Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 527 (1849) (Woodbury, J., dissenting) (observing that the Alien Friends Act “was generally denounced as unconstitutional, and suffered
to expire without renewal”); CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong, 2d Sess. app. at 243 (1845) (statement of
Rep. Henry C. Murphy); ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 227 & n.67 (Liberty Fund 1999) (1803); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137
n.24.
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Yet the transatlantic slave trade ban also illustrates how even while Congress maintained fidelity to the Democratic-Republican arguments of 1798, it
creatively exercised its enumerated powers to regulate the movement of people. Later Congresses similarly invoked specific provisions of the Constitution
to regulate the movement of enslaved people 220 and to expel indigenous communities from their homes. 221 And while members of Congress long remained
skeptical that Congress could regulate people as articles of commerce, they had
no compunction about using the Commerce Clause to regulate ships, including ships bearing immigrant passengers. 222 Accordingly, beginning in 1819,
Congress required all passenger ships to ensure that immigrants received sufficient water, provisions, and space to survive the voyage. 223 Congress later
awarded these immigrants homesteads by invoking its power to “dispose of”
federal territory. 224 And Congress protected these immigrants’ civil rights by
invoking its power to make treaties and enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 225
The expiration of the Alien Friends Act therefore did not signal the end
of federal immigration law. But the first century of federal immigration law
was constructed in the shadow of the Act’s presumed unconstitutionality. 226
Indeed, when politicians intermittently proposed federal laws to discourage
immigration, members of Congress rejected their proposals as “the old ‘alien
law,’ under a thin disguise.” 227 Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio even predicted
in 1854 that “with the repeal of the odious alien law, these illiberal and unjust

220. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 18, at 790–822 (discussing the Commerce Clause and Territory Clause).
221. See, e.g., CLAUDIO SAUNT, UNWORTHY REPUBLIC 44, 239–49 (2020) (discussing the
Commerce Clause and the war powers).
222. COX & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 40, at 21 (calling these enactments “oft-overlooked in
discussions of American immigration history”). For example, the second statute passed by the
First Congress was an act that regulated customs duties for incoming commercial traffic, and
subsequent Congresses passed laws regulating the coastal shipping trade without objection. Act
of Jul. 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24.
223. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1855, ch. 213, 10 Stat. 715; Act of Mar. 2, 1819, ch. 46, 3 Stat.
488, 489.
224. See, e.g., Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 246, 13 Stat. 385 (repealed 1868); Act of May 20, 1862,
ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976).
225. See, e.g., Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Act of Feb. 9, 1869, ch. 24, 15
Stat. 269; Additional Articles to the Treaty Between the United States and China, of June 18,
1958, China-U.S., July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739, 740 [hereinafter Burlingame-Seward Treaty of
1868]; Act of Feb. 19, 1862, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340 (repealed 1974).
226. See, e.g., 1 VON HOLST, supra note 16, at 142 (calling the Alien Friends Act “unquestionably unconstitutional” in 1876).
227. CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 60 (1854) (statement of Rep. William
Barry); see, e.g., 3 REG. DEB. 1268–69 (1829) (statement of Rep. William C. Rives) (describing
the Alien Friends Act as “a flagrant violation of the Constitution” and “a reign of terror”); see
also, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 832–33 (1852) (statement of Rep. Edson B.
Olds); 9 REG. DEB. 287–88 (1833) (statement of Sen. George M. Bibb).
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notions, prejudices, and practices passed away, I trust forever.” 228 Unfortunately, this prediction would prove to be wildly incorrect.
II.

THE IMMIGRATION CLAUSE AFTER 1876

In 1884, shortly before he returned home to California to launch a shortlived bid for the presidency, 229 Stephen Field wrote a blistering opinion for his
day job on the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court had just suggested that Congress could exercise whatever financial powers are “inherent
in the United States as a sovereign government,” 230 and Justice Field was enraged. Excoriating his colleagues for neglecting the “framers of the Constitution,” Field insisted “there is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty
in the government of the United States.” 231 Instead, Field wrote, the United
States was “a government of delegated powers, supreme within its prescribed
sphere, but powerless outside of it. In this country sovereignty resides in the
people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their
Constitution, entrusted to it.” 232
Field repeated his anti-sovereign sentiment a few years later in an 1893
immigration opinion. This time he observed that he was merely repeating
James Madison’s arguments against the Alien Friends Act. 233 “When, therefore, power is exercised by Congress, authority for it must be found in express
terms in the Constitution, or in the means necessary or proper for the execution of the power expressed,” Field wrote. 234 “If it cannot be thus found, it does
not exist.” 235
Despite Field’s twin denunciations of “a power of inherent sovereignty”
in 1884 and 1893, he allegedly reached the opposite conclusion in a fateful
opinion in 1889: the Chinese Exclusion Case. 236 Although Field understood
this 1889 opinion as a relatively insignificant discussion of Congress’s power
to abrogate a treaty, his opinion would later be interpreted as if he were awarding Congress a novel, freestanding immigration power derived from the “sovereignty” of the United States rather than the text of the Constitution.237 This
interpretation of the Chinese Exclusion Case would profoundly transform immigration law long after Field’s death. Yet it is based on a misunderstanding.

228. CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 1717 (1854).
229. See PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD 234 (1997).
230. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 440 (1884) (citing the General Welfare Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
231. Id. at 467 (Field, J., dissenting).
232. Id.
233. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 746–50 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 758.
235. Id.
236. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
237. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (citing
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581).

May 2022]

The Imaginary Immigration Clause

1449

Field’s intended meaning in the Chinese Exclusion Case, which continues
to vex scholars and judges today, can by clarified by reading it in the context
of his lengthy career on the bench. As a judge who served on the California
Supreme Court for over fifteen years and then the Supreme Court of the
United States, Field participated in the national trend of interpreting the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause to give the federal government “plenary”
power over foreign shipping, including ships carrying immigrants. 238 The
term plenary did not mean unlimited, unchecked, or extraconstitutional
power. It merely signified that the Constitution established a “representative
government[],” and therefore when Congress exercised its enumerated powers within constitutional limits, the only things that could control Congress’s
discretion were the “[t]he wisdom” of its members, “their identity with the
people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections.” 239
This meant that when Congress exercised its enumerated powers to encourage
immigration, Field invalidated xenophobic state laws to the contrary. 240 And
when federal legislation shifted after 1875 to restrict immigration, 241 Field and
his judicial colleagues upheld Congress’s power “to pass a law regulating immigration as a part of commerce of this country with foreign nations.” 242
Yet these newly restrictive federal laws often interfered with earlier laws
and treaties that encouraged immigration, particularly immigration from
China. 243 In the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court addressed whether Congress’s enumerated powers permitted the government to repudiate promises
made in earlier treaties. 244 In a unanimous opinion, Field answered yes. 245 He
explained that if China or any another nation could control Congress’s discretion with a treaty, the United States would no longer be an independent “sovereign,” in control of its own destiny. 246 Instead, Field held that the
enumerated powers that permitted Congress to protect the nation—including
its powers to regulate foreign commerce and to make treaties—were “all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the Constitution itself.” 247

238. See, e.g., In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 216 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1874)
(No. 102).
239. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
240. See In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 217–18.
241. See Neuman, supra note 17, at 1837 n.20 (describing “pervasive federal regulation” as
“obviously absent prior to 1875”).
242. Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 591, 600 (1884); see also
Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y.C., 92 U.S. 259, 270–71 (1876).
243. See The Chinese Cannot Come, S.F. CHRON., May 14, 1889, at 4; Brief for Appellant at
5–9, Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (No.
1446).
244. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 600; see also Brief for Respondent at 3, The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (No. 1446) (“There is but one question before the Court,
which is, as to the power of Congress to rescind the treaty.”).
245. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 599–603.
246. Id. at 603–04.
247. Id. at 604.
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He therefore concluded that no actions of any previous administrations could
divest Congress of “an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government
of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution.”248
Field invoked the term “sovereignty” not to provide an extraconstitutional source of Congress’s power to exclude immigrants but to explain why
Congress’s enumerated powers permitted exclusion and could not be restricted by another nation. 249 Contemporary readers understood this, describing the Chinese Exclusion Case as a case about “Treaty Rights.” 250 But since the
early twentieth century, readers have mistakenly interpreted Field’s language
as if “he believed . . . that every sovereign nation had inherent authority to exclude strangers from its territory.” 251 Even the Supreme Court began to cite
the Chinese Exclusion Case as if Congress’s power to exclude immigrants were
a power derived from its “sovereignty,” 252 not, as Field had written, an ordinary exercise of “those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution.” 253
This misreading of the Chinese Exclusion Case has provided an extraconstitutional foundation for federal immigration law that neither the Supreme Court
nor Congress has ever explained. The story of Field’s career and legacy therefore goes further toward answering where Congress’s power over immigration
came from than does the Constitution itself.
A. The State Police Power Versus the Federal Commerce Clause
When Stephen Field joined the California Supreme Court in 1857, 254 he
presided over a state whose legislature exercised virtually unchecked authority
to exclude, deport, and otherwise regulate the residence of immigrants within
its borders. 255 As in 1798, when opponents of the Alien Friends Act argued
that immigration was a power reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment,
states across the country continued to treat immigration as an issue firmly
within their control, like slavery.
States took advantage of this liberal legal regime to regulate immigration
in a variety of ways. From Mississippi to Illinois, many state legislatures spent
the early nineteenth century passing laws that excluded from their borders all
new black people, whether enslaved or free. 256 Oregon’s 1857 constitution was
248. Id. at 609.
249. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 757–58 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
250. Recent Case, supra note 33, at 136.
251. COX & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 40, at 34; see, e.g., Henkin, supra note 39, at 857–58
n.20.
252. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945).
253. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609.
254. Field, Stephen Johnson, CQ PRESS, https://library.cqpress.com/scc/document.php?
id=bioenc-427-18166-979216&v=397d0887e8b70877 [perma.cc/P3Q7-PK3W].
255. COX & RODRIGUEZ, supra note , at –.
256. See HIROTA, supra note 18, at 87; KATE MASUR, UNTIL JUSTICE BE DONE 71–72
(2021); see, e.g., Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 497 (1841).
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typical, requiring state officials to deport and punish any “free negro or mulatto, not residing in this state at the time of the adoption of this constitution.” 257 Even as they excluded black people, most states outside the Northeast
were eager for white settlers, actively encouraging European immigration. 258
Many, like Oregon, even opened the franchise to “every white male of foreign
birth” who lived in the state and “declared his intention to become a citizen of
the United States.” 259
By contrast, as ports of entry for the majority of European immigrants,
New York and Massachusetts adopted restrictive codes that sought to exclude
any immigrant considered too impoverished or criminal to sustain themselves
peaceably. 260 The two states also began levying taxes and bonds on incoming
arrivals and using the funds to pay for the relief of “the alien poor.” 261 By the
mid-nineteenth century, a xenophobic political organization, the Know Nothing Party, emerged in New York and quickly dominated the politics of Massachusetts. 262 The hub of abolitionism adopted one of the first complex
bureaucracies to exclude and expel allegedly inferior immigrants. 263
California soon followed suit, adopting a policy of admitting white and
black Americans but excluding immigrants. 264 In 1850, California prohibited
“foreign miners” from working in the state unless they paid a steep license
fee. 265 And over the next two decades, the state focused its anti-immigrant legislation against Chinese immigrants in particular. 266 In 1852, on the theory
that all Chinese men belonged “to a class of Asiatics known as ‘Coolies,’ who
are sent here . . . under contract to work,” California’s governor urged the legislature to suppress the “wholesale importation to this country, of immigrants
from the Asiatic quarter of the globe.” 267 By purposefully conflating voluntary
immigration with the involuntary “coolie trade,” 268 the governor treated Chi-

257. OR. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 35; see MASUR, supra note 256, at 264–66 (discussing
congressional debate over Oregon’s provision).
258. COX & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 40, at 20; HIROTA, supra note 18, at 86–87 & n.56.
259. OR. CONST. of 1857, art. II, § 2; see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 27–28
(rev. ed. 2009).
260. See LEE, supra note 9, at 70; HIROTA, supra note 18, at 58–59, 86 (referencing a third
major port, New Orleans); Kunal M. Parker, State, Citizenship, and Territory: The Legal Construction of Immigrants in Antebellum Massachusetts, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 583, 591 (2001).
261. Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 316 (1849); see HIROTA,
supra note 18, at 55–69.
262. HIROTA, supra note 18, at 95–96.
263. See LEE, supra note 9, at 69–70; HIROTA, supra note 18, at 75–83; Parker, supra note
260, at 611, 621–27.
264. See HIROTA, supra note 18, at 88.
265. See People ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 232, 233, 240 (1850).
266. HIROTA, supra note 18, at 89–91.
267. Governor’s Message to the Senate and Assembly (Apr. 23, 1852), in JOURNAL OF THE
THIRD SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 373 (1852).
268. See Act of Feb. 19, 1862, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340–41 (1862) (repealed 1974).
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nese immigration as if it were as devastating as slavery to free labor and republican values. 269 And beginning in 1855, California’s legislature adopted a
half-dozen laws with names like “An Act to prevent the further immigration
of Chinese or Mongolians to this State.” 270
California’s business community challenged several of these laws in a
court whose leader, Stephen Field, was sympathetic to the community’s demand for cheap labor. Against the backdrop of a constitutional jurisprudence
drafted by the Federalist chief justice of the United States, John Marshall, Justice Field used these cases to draw a firm boundary between Congress’s power
to regulate the entry of immigrants and states’ power to “police” them after
their arrival. Justice Field’s understanding of Marshall’s division between state
and federal power provides us with a crucial backdrop both for Congress’s
late-twentieth century immigration laws and for the Chinese Exclusion Case
itself.
1.

Chief Justice Marshall and the Federal Commerce Clause

The courts were not the most intuitive place to challenge California’s antiChinese laws before the Civil War. No provision of the U.S. Constitution expressly prohibited state immigration laws. But in a series of decisions between
1819 and 1849, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,” 271 as an
exclusive power that states could not exercise. Counterintuitively, these decisions would shape the trajectory of immigration laws in California and elsewhere for the entire nineteenth century.
These Supreme Court cases were initiated by Chief Justice John Marshall,
a former member of John Adams’s cabinet whose career on the bench survived long after the Democratic-Republican takeover of the federal government. 272 Bowing to his opponents’ triumph, Marshall accepted their argument
that Congress’s power to enact legislation was limited only to laws that could
be “implied as incidental to [its enumerated powers], or used as a means of

269. See WHITE, supra note 59, at 298–300.
270. Act of Apr. 26, 1858, ch. 313, 1858 Cal. Stat. 295 (“An Act to prevent the further immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to this State”); Act of Apr. 26, 1862, ch. 339, 1862 Cal. Stat.
462 (“An Act to protect Free White Labor against competition with Chinese Coolie Labor, and
to discourage the Immigration of the Chinese into the State of California”); Act of Mar. 18, 1870,
ch. 230, 1870 Cal. Stat. 330 (“An Act to prevent the kidnapping and importation of Mongolian,
Chinese, and Japanese females, for criminal or demoralizing purposes”); Act of Mar. 31, 1866,
ch. 505, 1866 Cal. Stat. 641 (“An Act for the suppression of Chinese houses of ill-fame”); Act of
Mar. 18, 1870, ch. 231, 1870 Cal. Stat. 332 (“An Act to prevent the importation of Chinese criminals and to prevent the establishment of Coolie slavery”); Act of Feb. 7, 1874, ch. 76, 1874 Cal.
Stat. 84 (“An Act to amend an Act entitled an Act for the suppression of Chinese houses of illfame”).
271. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
272. See HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–1835,
at 9, 53 (1997).
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executing them.” 273 Yet he put a Federalist spin on this limited federal power
by adding that the Constitution made Congress “supreme within its sphere of
action,” giving it all “power appertaining to sovereignty . . . so far as it is calculated to subserve the legitimate objects of that government.” 274 In other
words, Marshall conceded that the federal government did not possess all the
powers held by other sovereigns; its “power appertaining to sovereignty” 275
existed only within a limited “sphere of action.” 276 But within that sphere, the
Constitution permitted Congress to act like any other sovereign, with the exclusive power to decide how to achieve its “legitimate objects.” 277
Marshall first applied this exclusive “sphere of action” idea to the Commerce Clause in a famous 1824 opinion, Gibbons v. Ogden. At issue were two
conflicting laws: a New York law that prohibited certain steamship operators
from running ferries to neighboring New Jersey and a federal law that permitted anyone with a federal license to engage in commerce along the Atlantic
coast. 278 When New York enjoined a federal license holder from operating a
ferry, the license holder complained that New York was interfering with Congress’s exclusive power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among
the several States.” 279 Marshall agreed. Defining “Commerce” broadly to refer
to all shipping, 280 Marshall wrote that passenger shipping was part of the
“commerce . . . among the several States.” 281 Because regulating interstate
commerce fell within Congress’s exclusive sphere of action, Marshall concluded that no other government, including the New York legislature, could
obstruct Congress’s judgment about who could engage in the transportation
of passengers across state lines. 282
Marshall’s description of Congress’s power to regulate commerce would
later provide the vocabulary for judicial discussions of federal and state immigration law. Just as Marshall had earlier identified a constitutional sphere of
action in which Congress could exercise “power appertaining to sovereignty,” 283 in Gibbons, he identified the Commerce Clause as one sector of this
sphere. 284 So long as an issue reflected “commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States,” the issue fell within “the sovereignty of Congress”
and was subject to Congress’s “plenary” power. 285 By the terms sovereignty and
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405–06, 411, 421 (1819).
Id.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 411.
Gibbons v. Ogden,  U.S. ( Wheat.) , – ().
See id. at 199–201.
Id. at 189–90.
See id. at 177.
Id.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819).
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196–97.
Id. at 197.
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plenary, Marshall did not mean Congress possessed limitless power. He cautioned that Congress remained subject to the “restrictions on the exercise of
the power as are found in the constitution.” 286 Instead, he used the two terms
to explain that when Congress exercised one of its enumerated powers, its
power was as supreme as that of any other sovereign nation. In “all representative governments,” Marshall wrote, the only restraints on a legislature’s constitutional exercises of power were political, not legal. 287 These political
restraints included “[t]he wisdom and the discretion of [legislators], their
identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at
elections.” 288 These restraints did not, by contrast, include obstructions raised
by New York, whose law therefore had to give way to federal supremacy.
An important implication of Marshall’s logic in Gibbons was that a jurisdictional boundary separated Congress’s exclusive sphere of action from the
states’ power to “police” their internal affairs. 289 Within Congress’s sphere,
Congress possessed “plenary” authority to impose whatever regulations that
were consistent with constitutional limits and the tolerance of voters. States
like New York were not permitted to enter this sphere. Yet Marshall also accepted that Congress’s sphere had to end somewhere. Before he died in 1835,
Marshall drew the boundary of Congress’s exclusive sphere at the point where
an article of commerce stopped traveling across state or international borders
and “bec[a]me incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the
[state].” 290 At that point—once the voyage ended and the article stopped moving—Congress’s power over it ceased, and the article instead became subject
to the states’ “police power.” 291
After Marshall’s death, a new generation of Supreme Court justices
reevaluated his precedents and adopted a more limited vision of federal
power. Yet the Court’s immigration cases drew the federal-state boundary in
the same place he did—even as it inconsistently determined on which side of
the boundary a particular law fell. 292 For instance, in 1837’s City of New York
v. Miln, the Court considered a state law that required passenger ships to provide descriptions of their passengers so that municipal officials would know

286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 203–04.
290. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441–43 (1827).
291. Id.
292. This inconsistency was attributable in part to slavery, as Marshall’s boundary threatened to undermine the dozens of state laws that regulated the admission of free or enslaved black
people. See, e.g., The Cynosure, 6 F. Cas. 1102 (D. Mass. 1844) (No. 3,529) (striking down a state
exclusion of free black people); Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 505–07 (1841) (enslaved persons at issue) (upholding a Mississippi regulation of slavery); id. at 510 (Story, J., concurring) (“[T]he provision of the Constitution of the United States, which gives the regulation
of commerce to Congress, did not interfere with the provision of the constitution of the state of
Mississippi, which relates to the introduction of slaves as merchandise, or for sale.”).
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who to scrutinize as “liable to become chargeable on the city.” 293 Like Marshall, the Court emphasized that Congress’s commercial power extended only
to passengers “whilst on their voyage, and until they shall have landed.” 294 After landing—“when they have ceased to have any connexion [sic] with the
ship”—people became subject to the exclusive regulation of state laws, “whose
operation only begins when that of the laws of congress ends.” 295 On the theory that New York’s law applied only after the immigrants landed, the Miln
Court determined that New York’s law was not “a regulation of commerce,
but of police,” and was therefore valid. 296 In 1849, by contrast, in the Passenger
Cases, a fractured Court invalidated a similar New York law that imposed a
blanket tax on all immigrants before “the persons who may be brought as passengers have been landed.” 297
2.

Justice Field in California

After the Passenger Cases, the Supreme Court wouldn’t reconsider the
constitutionality of a state or federal immigration law until 1876. 298 In the
meantime, Stephen Field reviewed California’s anti-Chinese laws several
times from his seat on the California Supreme Court. Even after he was elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1863, Field continued to review anti-Chinese laws as he “rode circuit” in California and Oregon and spent much of his
time sitting individually on federal trial courts. 299
In decision after decision between 1857 and 1876, Field applied Marshall’s
boundary line to hold that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the “exclusive
power” to regulate “the transportation of passengers from foreign ports to the
ports of the United States as a branch of commerce.” 300 He voted to uphold
California’s laws only if they took effect after “foreigners become residents of
[the] State.” 301 Because his decisions involved zero-sum interpretations of
Congress’s power to regulate commerce, every time Justice Field limited California’s power to exclude Chinese immigrants, he necessarily implied that

293. See 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 104–05 (1837).
294. Id. at 138.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 132. In his dissent, Justice Joseph Story observed that the late Chief Justice Marshall personally thought the New York immigration law was unconstitutional for the same reasons as the New York monopoly law in Gibbons (and the Maryland law in Brown v. Maryland,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827)). Id. at 161 (Story, J., dissenting). The Court’s disagreement,
therefore, was more over the application of Marshall’s rules than the rules themselves.
297. Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 410, 422 (1849) (Wayne,
J., concurring).
298. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92
U.S. 259 (1876). But see Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (considering a state
transit tax).
299. KENS, supra note 229, at 93–98, 134–35, 202–06.
300. Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, 583–85 (1862) (Field, C.J., dissenting).
301. Id.
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“recourse must be had to the federal government, where the whole power over
this subject lies.”302 The reverse was true, too: if he believed California had the
power to regulate or deport people, it was only because “the power of Congress
over them, as subjects within its commercial regulations, was exhausted.” 303
So even as Field steadily recognized Congress’s exclusive power to regulate the
immigration of foreigners, he derived that power from the Commerce
Clause—whose operation within a state’s borders he considered as limited as
it had been during the 1798 debate over the Alien Friends Act. Eventually acceding to Justice Field’s widely shared interpretation of Marshall’s boundary
line, even the California legislature accepted the premise that under the Commerce Clause, “[t]he [p]olice of the ocean belongs to Congress. The [p]olice
of the land belongs to the States.” 304
Field’s application of the federal Commerce Clause reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1876. At issue was another California law that imposed a $500
penalty on any ship that attempted to land any “lewd or debauched woman”—
a crude euphemism for Chinese women. 305 Evaluating the law in 1874 while
riding circuit, Field expressed his sympathy with the “very general feeling prevailing in this state against the Chinese, and in opposition to the extension of
any encouragement to their immigration hither.” 306 But because the Commerce Clause gave Congress the exclusive power to regulate ongoing voyages,
Field invalidated the law while urging white Californians to seek recourse with
the federal government instead. 307 The rest of the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Field’s ruling in Chy Lung v. Freeman. 308 The Court explained that the power to enact “laws which concern the admission of citizens
and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to
the States. It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations: the
responsibility for the character of those regulations . . . belongs solely to the
national government.” 309
3.

Congress Exercises the Commerce Clause to Exclude

Listening to Field and his colleagues repeatedly declare that only
Congress could regulate the admission of foreigners, politicians in California
began lobbying Congress to adopt their state’s immigration policies as federal

302. In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 217 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102).
303. Lin Sing, 20 Cal. at 584.
304. Id. at 554.
305. In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 215.
306. Id. at 217.
307. Id.
308. 92 U.S. 275, 281 (1876).
309. Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280; see also Henderson v. Mayor of New York., 92 U.S. 259
(1876) (invalidating a New York law the same day on identical grounds).
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exercises of the Commerce Clause. 310 After Field invalidated California’s “debauched women” ban in 1874, Representative Page of California even quoted
the entirety of Field’s opinion on the House floor. 311 “It appears by the opinion . . . that the Legislature of California have attempted to deal with this subject,” Page explained. 312 “But . . . in the opinion of the Federal courts, we find
that the State Legislature has no power over the subject, and that it is entirely
within the control of Congress.” 313 Page therefore proposed a federal bill to
make it illegal to “import” into the United States “women for the purposes of
prostitution.” 314
Congress passed the Page Act of 1875—the first-ever federal restriction of
immigration—after virtually no debate about the law’s constitutionality. 315
None was necessary: Field’s earlier interpretations of the Commerce Clause
supplied Congress with sufficient constitutional justification to enact the law.
And his opinions afterward continued to declare that “the treaty-making
power and the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations” permitted
Congress “to prescribe the conditions of immigration or importation of persons.” 316
As California emerged as a critical swing state in the presidential election
of 1876, 317 the national Republican and Democratic Parties each praised the
Page Act and inserted planks into their platforms calling for “such legislation
within constitutional limitations, as shall prevent further importation or immigration of the Mongolian race.” 318 For the next two decades, members of
Congress noticed that “[a] campaign does not appear to be complete without
some additional Chinese legislation”; 319 a new law arrived “every other year
with the elections, and the writer searches the dictionary for words to surpass

310. The state Republican and Democratic parties supported federal action as early as
1869. See WINFIELD J. DAVIS, HISTORY OF POLITICAL CONVENTIONS IN CALIFORNIA, 1849–1892,
at 293, 299–300, 307–08, 327 (Sacramento, Cal. State Libr. 1893). The California legislature itself
began petitioning Congress for immigration restrictions in 1872. H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 43-204, at
1 (1874); see also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1556 (1872).
311. 3 CONG. REC. app. at 42–43 (1875) (statement of Rep. Horace Page).
312. Id. at 43.
313. Id.
314. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974).
315. See 3 CONG. REC. 1,113, 1,454, 1,599 (1875).
316. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 256 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1879)
(No. 6,546); see also New York v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59 (1883).
317. Vincent Geloso & Linan Peng, Postbellum Electoral Politics in California and the Genesis of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Geo. Mason Univ., Working Paper in Economics No.
21-29, 2021).
318. THE REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN TEXT-BOOK FOR 1884, at 187 (New York, Republican
Nat’l Comm. 1884); ELMER CLARENCE SANDMEYER, THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN
CALIFORNIA 49 (Illini Books ed. 1991); see also DAVIS, supra note 310, at 341.
319. 19 CONG. REC. 7,698 (1888) (statement of Rep. O’Neill); see, e.g., S. REP. NO. 44-689
(1877) (calling for the restriction of Chinese immigration in a bipartisan 1,200-page report developed over the summer of 1876).
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predecessors.” 320 Although skeptics condemned the federal government for
adopting “a new governmental policy upon the basis of color . . . [predicated
on] antipathy to the Mongolian race [that] is equal to that which was formerly
entertained in the older States against the negro,”321 none challenged the restrictionists’ certainty about their “unquestionable” authority to restrict immigration. 322
Representatives from the largest swing state of all, New York, also clamored for Congress to federalize their own state’s immigration laws. 323 Congress listened in 1882, passing a general Immigration Act that authorized New
York and other states to exclude certain immigrants and collect passenger
taxes for those they admitted. 324 When a shipping company challenged the
constitutionality of these new federal taxes in 1884, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld them. Citing a half-century of precedent applying Marshall’s
boundary line, the Court declared in the Head Money Cases that “[t]he burden
imposed on the ship owner by this statute is the mere incident of the regulation of commerce—of that branch of foreign commerce which is involved in
immigration.” 325
B. The Commerce Clause Versus the Treaty Clause
After 1875, virtually no member of Congress contested the constitutional
power of the federal government to exclude certain immigrants as an exercise
of the Commerce Clause. But many politicians objected to the constitutionality of a federal law that violated a treaty. In contrast with ordinary legislation,
a treaty could take effect only with supermajority support from the Senate. 326
It also represented a promise with a foreign nation that could lead to international trouble if repudiated.
The issue of treaties cast a shadow on Congress’s attempt to restrict Chinese immigration because in 1868, the United States entered into a treaty with
China in which it promised to guarantee the “voluntary emigration” of Chinese immigrants. 327 When Congress passed the Page Act in 1875, it limited

320. 23 CONG. REC. 2,913 (1892) (statement of Rep. Hitt); id. at 3625 (statement of Sen.
Sherman) (finding the progression of anti-Chinese legislation to reflect a “mere political race”
between the two parties).
321. Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 45-20, at 3, 8 (1878) (statement of former Sen. Morton).
322. Cf. 8 CONG. REC. 797 (1879) (statement of Rep. Page).
323. HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE GILDED AGE 387–88 (Leonard Schlup & James G.
Ryan eds., 2003); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION, FOR THE YEAR
ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1876, S. 100-21, 1st Sess., at 8 (N.Y. 1877); H. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFS.,
THE REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION, H.R. REP. NO. 46-1, at 3 (1879).
324. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
325. Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 595 (1884).
326. See GIENAPP, supra note 59, at 248–86.
327. Burlingame-Seward Treaty of , supra note , at .
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itself to prohibiting the involuntary migration of Chinese laborers and prostitutes 328—a limit that many members of Congress regarded as consistent with
the treaty but insufficient to slow immigration. 329 By contrast, when Congress
passed a bill in 1879 that prohibited incoming steamships from carrying more
than fifteen Chinese passengers, President Rutherford B. Hayes vetoed the bill
on the ground that it violated the treaty. 330 President Hayes argued that even
though Congress had the constitutional power to unilaterally repeal an entire
treaty by statute, the law of nations typically required the repealing nation to
offer “some reason both of the highest justice and of the highest necessity”—
neither of which he thought was evident. 331 Hayes worried that such a “casual
infraction” would effectively repeal the treaty and lead to penalties against
American merchants abroad. 332 He therefore urged Congress to wait for his
administration to renegotiate the treaty, which he sent commissioners to accomplish in 1880. 333
In China, Commissioner James B. Angell presented the Chinese commissioners with a proposal to authorize the United States to “regulate, limit, suspend, or prohibit” the “coming of Chinese laborers to the United States, or
their residence therein.” 334 When the Chinese delegation objected that such
language would authorize the United States to adopt blatantly discriminatory
legislation, Angell’s team accepted a compromise. 335 The final version of the
Angell Treaty of 1880 allowed the United States to “regulate, limit, or suspend” the entry of Chinese laborers, but not to absolutely prohibit it. 336 It also
required any such limitation to be “reasonable” and to “apply only to Chinese . . . laborers, other classes not being included in the limitations.” 337 The
treaty also declared that “Chinese laborers who are now in the United States
shall be allowed to go and come of their own free will and accord,” and that if
any Chinese person in the United States received “ill treatment at the hands
of any other persons,” then the federal government would “exert all its power
to devise measures for their protection.” 338

328. Act of Mar. , , ch. ,  Stat.  (repealed ).
329. See S. REP. NO. 44-689, at viii (1877).
330. 8 CONG. REC. 2,275–76 (1879).
331. Id. at 2276.
332. Id.
333. See id.; James Tobin, Angell, China, and Opium, UNIV. OF MICH. HERITAGE PROJECT,
https://heritage.umich.edu/stories/angell-china-and-opium [perma.cc/H2X5-M3BF].
334. Letter from the United States Commission to Mr. Evarts (October 23, 1880), in
PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 177–78 (Washington,
Government Printing Office 1882).
335. See id. at 186–88.
336. Angell Treaty of 1880, China-U.S., Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826, 826.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 827.
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In 1882, after the Senate ratified the Angell Treaty, Representative Page of
California proposed legislation to enforce it. 339 Over the objection of opponents who criticized Page’s bill as racist and demeaning, 340 supporters maintained that Congress’s power to enforce treaties was an unassailable
implication of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 341 President Chester Arthur
signed Page’s bill into law as “An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese.” 342 The new law—remembered today as the Chinese Exclusion Act but described at the time as the Chinese Restriction Act 343—
contained four main provisions. First, it suspended the immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years, authorizing federal customs officials to prohibit
ships from landing Chinese miners or manual workers. 344 Second, it required
incoming Chinese merchants, students, diplomats, and other nonlaborers to
obtain certificates from the Chinese government identifying their occupation. 345 Third, it required Chinese laborers already in the United States to obtain certificates from the federal government if they wished to leave
temporarily and return. 346 Finally, it authorized the president to remove “any
Chinese person found unlawfully within the United States” after a federal
court evaluated their legal status. 347
Justice Field embraced the supporters’ interpretation of the Act when he
first reviewed it in 1882 while riding circuit in California. Observing that the
Act “was framed in supposed conformity with the provisions of this supplementary treaty,” he interpreted its provisions narrowly so as not to “go beyond
the limitations prescribed by the treaty.” 348 In one notable opinion, he even
suggested that the Act applied only to immigrants from China and not to immigrants of Chinese descent from places not covered by the Angell Treaty,
such as the British colony of Hong Kong. 349 Other judges followed his lead,
declaring that the “only object” of the Act was to enforce the Angell Treaty,

339. See H.R. REP. NO. 47-1017 (1882). The initial version of this bill was vetoed for being
too restrictive in violation of the Angell Treaty. 13 CONG. REC. 2,551–52 (1882).
340. See, e.g., 13 CONG. REC. 3,265 (1882) (statement of Sen. Hoar); id. at 3264 (statement
of Sen. Hawley); id. at 2177–83 (statement of Rep. Browne).
341. See, e.g., 13 CONG. REC. app. 54–55 (1882) (statement of Rep. Tucker); 13 CONG. REC.
3,408–09 (1882) (statement of Sen. Edmunds); In re Low Yam Chow, 13 F. 605, 607–11 (Field,
Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
342. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943); see H.R. REP. NO.
47-1017.
343. See, e.g., United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 625–26 (1888). See generally
Beth Lew-Williams, Before Restriction Became Exclusion: America’s Experiment in Diplomatic
Immigration Control, 83 PAC. HIST. REV. 24, 26 (2014).
344. §§ 1, 15, 22 Stat. at 59, 61.
345. See id. §§ 6, 9, at 60.
346. Id. §§ 4–5, at 59–60.
347. Id. § 12, at 61.
348. In re Low Yam Chow, 13 F. 605, 608 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
349. Id. at 609.
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not to exercise some alternative power to restrict immigration from outside of
China. 350
Field adjusted course the following year, however, as Hong Kong became
a major port of departure for Chinese immigrants to the United States. Predicting that “the island of Hong Kong would pour such laborers into our
country every year in unnumbered thousands, unless they also were covered
by the restriction act,” Field concluded that the Act’s authors must have “had
a double purpose”: one to enforce the treaty with China, and a second to exclude “laborers of the Chinese race coming from any other part of the
world.” 351 Field’s new interpretation of the Act was consistent with his personal views: he privately worried that the United States was made “for our
race—the Caucasian race,” and that “everything connected with the Chinese
prevent the possibility of their ever assimilating with our people.” 352 But it
raised a constitutional problem: if the Chinese Restriction Act excluded immigrants whom the Angell Treaty did not cover, then the statute might conflict with treaties involving the United Kingdom, which controlled Hong
Kong. 353
In an 1883 case involving a Chinese immigrant from Hong Kong, In re
Ah Lung, Field offered an explanation of the relationship between federal immigration laws and treaties—one he would revive several times over the next
decade, including in the Chinese Exclusion Case six years later. Field began by
observing that the Constitution treats both treaties and statutes as the supreme
law of the land: an act of Congress “upon a subject within its legislative power
is as binding upon the courts as a treaty on the same subject.” 354 Because neither a statute nor a treaty has “paramount authority over the other,” he continued, a court’s role in evaluating a conflict between them is simply applying
whichever came later in time. 355 In this respect, Congress’s power to repeal an
act passed by an old Congress was equivalent to Congress’s power to repeal a
treaty ratified by an old Senate. So long as the new acts “relate to subjects
which the constitution has placed under that legislative power,” then no prior
Congress could forever bar a future Congress from exercising its legislative
power. 356
Applying this analysis to the situation before him, Field concluded that
the Constitution permitted Congress to exclude Chinese immigrants from

350. United States v. Douglas, 17 F. 634, 637–38 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883); In re Moncan, 14 F.
44, 45–46 (C.C.D. Or. 1882).
351. In re Ah Lung, 18 F. 28, 32 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1883).
352. Letter from Stephen J. Field to Professor J.N. Pomeroy (Apr. 14, 1882), in Four Letters
of Mr. Justice Field, 47 YALE L.J. 1100, 1104 (1938).
353. See 15 CONG. REC. 3,761 (1884) (statement of Rep. R.R. Hitt).
354. Id. at 3762 (quoting In re Ah Lung, 18 F. at 29).
355. In re Ah Lung, 18 F. at 29–32.
356. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 786 (Curtis, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.
Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799)).
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Hong Kong even if a treaty with the United Kingdom said otherwise. 357 Field
had already held that the exclusion of Chinese immigrants fell within Congress’s power to regulate commerce. 358 He therefore wrote in Ah Lung that
“[t]he immigration of foreigners to the United States, and the conditions upon
which they shall be permitted to remain, are appropriate subjects of legislation
as well as of treaty stipulation. No treaty can deprive congress of its power in
that respect.”359 If the United Kingdom objected, Field continued, such an objection was not a constitutional problem but a diplomatic problem: it “may
present its complaint to the executive department, and take such other
measures as it may deem that justice to its own citizens or subjects requires.” 360
The Supreme Court adopted Field’s analysis the following year, in 1884.
One of the issues in the Head Money Cases—the decision challenging the Immigration Act of 1882—was whether Congress’s regulation of European immigration violated a treaty with Russia that called for open immigration. 361
Citing Field’s opinion in Ah Lung, the Court held that a federal exercise of the
Commerce Clause could be constitutional even if it conflicted with preexisting
treaties. 362 “It is enough to say that, Congress having the power to pass a law
regulating immigration as a part of the commerce of this country with foreign
nations, we see nothing . . . forbidden by any other part of the Constitution,”
the Court wrote. 363 Field added on behalf of the Court four years later that
“[t]he duty of the courts is to construe and give effect to the latest expression
of the sovereign will.” 364
C. The Chinese Exclusion Case
1.

The Chinese Exclusion Act

As Field and the Supreme Court gave Congress legal sanction to violate
existing treaties, members of Congress became increasingly aggressive about
restricting Chinese immigration further than the Angell Treaty allowed. In
1884, for instance, Congress codified Field’s opinion in Ah Lung by amending
the Chinese Restriction Act to apply to all Chinese laborers “from any foreign
port or place.” 365 But for members from California and other Western states,
the Angell Treaty continued to pose three problems.

357. Id. at 32.
358. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 256 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1879)
(No. 6,546).
359. In re Ah Lung, 18 F. at 29.
360. Id. at 29–30.
361. Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 597 (1884).
362. Id. at 598 (citing In re Ah Lung, 18 F. at 28).
363. Id. at 600.
364. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888).
365. Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115 (1884) (repealed 1943); H.R. REP. NO. 48-614,
at 2 (1884).

May 2022]

The Imaginary Immigration Clause

1463

First, the treaty explicitly required Congress to freely admit Chinese merchants, students, tourists, and people in transit. 366 As thousands of Chinese
immigrants claimed to be members of these exempted classes, federal customs
officials developed arbitrary and ultimately ineffective metrics to distinguish
“laborers” from “merchants.” 367 Second, the treaty also protected the right of
Chinese laborers already in the United States “to go and come of their own
free will and accord.” 368 Although the Chinese Restriction Act instructed departing Chinese laborers to obtain a “certificate” as evidence of their U.S. residence, 369 the Secretary of the Treasury interpreted the treaty to allow any
incoming Chinese immigrant to present evidence that they had once lived in
the United States but had lost their certificate. 370 By 1887, over ten thousand
Chinese immigrants entered the United States every year—far more than before the Act was first passed. 371
Third, the treaty also required the United States to protect Chinese residents from “ill treatment at the hands of any other persons” 372—a responsibility that each branch of the federal government shirked. When white lynch
mobs in California began terrorizing Chinese residents, for example, the Supreme Court held over Field’s dissent that federal prosecutors had no power
to protect them. 373 Yet the federal government’s reluctance to protect Chinese
residents was not merely due to the law. Even when white people massacred
their Chinese neighbors in the U.S. territory of Wyoming, President Grover
Cleveland’s Administration blamed Chinese victims for choosing to live in
such a “remote and unprotected region.” 374
Beginning in 1886, as thousands of Chinese immigrants entered the
United States only to face hostile vigilantes, the government of China offered
to renegotiate the Angell Treaty. 375 In exchange for the United States’ payment
366. Angell Treaty of 1880, supra note 336, at 826.
367. See Kitty Calavita, Collisions at the Intersection of Gender, Race, and Class: Enforcing
the Chinese Exclusion Laws, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 249, 265 (2006).
368. Angell Treaty of 1880, supra note 336, at 827.
369. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, §§ 3, 6, 9, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (repealed 1943).
370. United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 142 U.S. 621, 634–35 (1888); see Circular from the
Treasury, No. 124 (Oct. 25, 1882), in SYNOPSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE TREASURY
DEPARTMENT ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TARIFF, NAVIGATION, AND OTHER LAWS FOR THE
YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1882, at 314, 315 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1883).
371. Lew-Williams, supra note 343, at 25.
372. Angell Treaty of 1880, supra note 336, at 686.
373. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 682, 704–05 (1887); id. at 707 (Field, J., dissenting).
374. Letter from T.F. Bayard to Mr. Cheng Tsao Ju (Feb. 18, 1886), in PAPERS RELATING
TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 158, 158–60 (Washington, Government
Printing Office 1887).
375. Letter from Cheng Tsao Ju to T.F. Bayard (Feb. 15, 1886), supra note 374, at 154, 156;
Telegram from Kwong Lun Hing & Co. to Cheng Tsao Ju (Feb. 11, 1886), supra at 156; Telegram
from Lee Kim Wah to Cheng Tsao Ju (Feb. 13, 1886), supra at 157; Telegram from Mr. Owyang
Ming to Mr. Cheng (Feb. 16, 1886), supra at 157; Telegram from Mr. Owyang Ming to Mr.
Cheng (Feb. 18, 1886), supra at 158.; see The Treaty with China: The Correspondence on the Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 19, 1888, at 9.
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of an indemnification to support the victims of anti-Chinese violence, China
offered to allow the United States to prohibit the admission of all Chinese laborers, including former U.S. residents, with limited exceptions. 376 President
Cleveland agreed to these terms in 1888, and the Senate ratified the Bayard–
Zhang Treaty that spring. 377 As Congress waited for the Chinese government
to ratify the treaty, it passed a statute known as the Chinese Exclusion Act “to
carry into effect the provisions of the treaty . . . and to provide against the evasion of its provisions by the classes prohibited from entering the United
States.” 378 The Act stated that it would take effect as soon as China ratified the
treaty. 379
Almost immediately after Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in
September 1888, however, rumors circulated that the Chinese government
was having second thoughts about ratification. 380 The timing could not have
been worse for the Cleveland Administration, as the presidential election was
only two months away. With “a wink or a nod from the White House,” one of
the president’s closest friends in Congress, Representative Scott of Pennsylvania, quickly proposed a backup bill in case the treaty fell apart. 381 His bill
promised to prohibit the admission of all Chinese laborers—including residents returning home from abroad under the terms of existing treaties—regardless of whether China ratified the new treaty. 382
The House unanimously passed Scott’s bill without debate, 383 and no senators doubted that the bill was “a regulation of commerce with foreign nations.” 384 But some senators expressed concern about the “injustice in the bill
arising out of the provision which prohibits the coming into this country of
any Chinese who have departed and have not returned at the time of the passage of the act.” 385 Even the bill’s supporters agreed that it violated the Angell
Treaty’s protection of returning U.S. residents. 386
But almost all of the bill’s supporters regarded its violation of existing
treaties as a feature, not a bug, because it restored to the United States its sovereign power “to exclude any and every class of people who are supposed to

376. Letter from Cheng Tsao Ju to T.F. Bayard (Nov. 30, 1886), supra note 374, at 101, 108;
see also 19 CONG. REC. 7,694–95 (1888).
377. Lew-Williams, supra note 343, at 48.
378. 19 CONG. REC. 6,569 (1888) (statement of Sen. Dolph).
379. Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat. 476 (repealed 1943).
380. Lew-Williams, supra note 343, at 48.
381. 19 CONG. REC. 8,365 (statement of Sen. Mitchell); 19 CONG. REC. 8,226 (statement of
Rep. Scott); see also William L. Scott Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1891, at 5.
382. Scott Act, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (repealed 1943).
383. 19 CONG. REC. 8,227 (1888).
384. Id.; id. at 8374 (statement of Sen. Hoar); see also id. at 8217 (statement of Sen. Sherman).
385. Id. at 8215 (statement of Sen. George); see, e.g., id. at 8219 (statement of Sen. Butler).
386. Id. at 8218 (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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be detrimental to the interests of the commonwealth.” 387 Senator Mitchell of
Oregon, for example, urged his colleagues to repeal “all our treaties with China
which restrict Congress and tie up its hands and prevent us from passing a law
which would forever exclude all Chinese from this country.” 388 President
Cleveland adopted similar reasoning when the Senate presented the bill for
his signature. 389 Although the president mentioned the injustice of excluding
returning residents currently “on their way” to the United States, he signed
the Scott Act without waiting for an amendment by which they “may be permitted to land.” 390
2.

The Supreme Court’s Opinion

One of those returning residents was Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese resident
of San Francisco who was on a ship in the Pacific when President Cleveland
signed the Scott Act. 391 When Chae arrived in San Francisco days later, federal
customs officials refused to allow him to disembark even though he had a return certificate authorized by the Chinese Restriction Act and Angell
Treaty. 392 With the assistance of local counsel, Chae challenged the constitutionality of the Scott Act because it “divest[ed] a right indefeasibly vested under the treaties and laws.” 393 He contended that the certificate was, in effect,
“a contract” that Congress had no power to breach by subsequent legislation. 394
The federal circuit court summarily rejected Chae’s argument, citing the
Head Money Cases and Field’s decision in Ah Lung for the proposition that
Congress had the constitutional power to repeal or violate existing treaties by
statute. 395 Chae appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, conceding in his
briefing that “the power ‘to regulate commerce with foreign nations’ may authorize congressional legislation to prevent the entry of foreign subjects.” 396
But he argued that such a power didn’t authorize Congress “to prohibit the
return to this country of the appellant. He had a vested right to return, which
could not be taken from him by any exercise of mere legislative power.” 397
G.A. Jenks, the U.S. solicitor general, defended the constitutionality of the
Scott Act by arguing that if Chae’s theory were correct, then a treaty could

387. Id. at 8217 (statement of Sen. Teller).
388. Id. at 8219 (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
389. Grover Cleveland, The Chinese Barred Out, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1888, at 1.
390. Id. at 2.
391. In re Chae Chan Ping, 36 F. 431, 431 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1888).
392. Id.
393. Id. at 433.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 433–35; see also Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Chinese Exclusion Act of
1888, 2 HARV. L. REV. 287 (1889).
396. Brief for Appellant, supra note 243, at 4.
397. Id.
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forever deprive Congress of its sovereign powers to legislate. “Full legislative
powers, in the United States, are committed to Congress,” Jenks wrote, citing
the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and other enumerated powers. 398 Jenks therefore thought it absurd to suggest that Congress
could not exercise one of these “full sovereign powers” because of a treaty with
a foreign nation or a certificate given to an individual. 399 Nor did the law of
nations require the United States to admit Chae: “International law fully establishes the right of a nation to exclude foreigners from its domain.” 400
Justice Field wrote a unanimous opinion on behalf of the Supreme Court
in Chae’s case, which was reported as the Chinese Exclusion Case. In light of
Chae’s argument and the solicitor general’s defense, the primary question before the Court was whether Congress could exercise its legislative powers to
nullify any right of return Chae possessed under the Angell Treaty of 1880 or
the Chinese Restriction Act of 1882, both of which Chae regarded as a “contract.” 401
Field began his opinion by conceding that “[a] treaty, it is true, is in its
nature a contract between nations.” 402 But because a treaty was “only the
equivalent of a legislative act,” it could be “repealed or modified at the pleasure
of Congress. In either case the last expression of the sovereign will must control.” 403 The Court had just decided this point in the Head Money Cases. 404
Field therefore dispensed with the suggestion that Congress could not abrogate the Angell Treaty.
Field spent far more time on Chae’s related argument that the Angell
Treaty and his certificate gave him a “vested right” to return to the United
States, a right that no statute could take away. He began his analysis by describing the power to exclude aliens as an “incident of every independent nation.” 405 Quoting Chief Justice Marshall, he wrote that a country’s
“sovereignty” could be limited only by its own laws, not “from an external
source” like a treaty with another nation. 406 But he did not end his analysis by
concluding that because other nations could exclude people, so could Congress. Instead, he immediately turned to “our Constitution” and wrote that it
empowered Congress alone to decide when to exercise all the sovereign powers that the document delegated to it. 407

398. Brief for the United States at 5, Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446).
399. See id.
400. Id. at 6.
401. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 589.
402. Id. at 600.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 600–03.
405. Id. at 603.
406. Id. at 604.
407. Id.
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“While under our Constitution and form of government the great mass
of local matters is controlled by local authorities,” he wrote, “the United States,
in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise
of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and
security throughout its entire territory.” 408 Like the solicitor general, he listed
some of these powers: “[t]he powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress
insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican
governments to the States, and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship.” 409 He explained that these powers “are all sovereign powers, restricted
in their exercise only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public
policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.”410 These “sovereign powers,” Field wrote, authorized Congress to conduct “our relations with foreign nations” and “give security against foreign
aggression and encroachment,” including when such aggression came from
“vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us.” 411 If Congress “considers the
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security,” Field concluded, no
contract, treaty, or condition of war or peace could prevent Congress from
excluding them. 412 “The power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of
sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of
those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution,” Field wrote. 413 “[T]he
right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the
interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on
behalf of any one.” 414
D. The Immediate Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Case
1.

The Commerce Clause

Read in context, the Chinese Exclusion Case was a relatively straightforward, racist opinion that reaffirmed Congress’s sovereign power to legislate
despite a contrary agreement. Field didn’t resurrect the old Federalist argument that because the United States was “sovereign,” it had an inherent power
to exclude people—an argument that would not have resolved whether such a
power belonged to Congress or to the states. Rather, he wrote that the Constitution delegated many powers to Congress, that those enumerated powers

408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 604, 606.
Id. at 606–09.
Id. at 609.
Id.
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“are all sovereign powers,” and that Congress’s sovereign powers could be restricted “only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy,”
not by treaty with China. 415
Toward the end of the Chinese Exclusion Case, Field specifically distinguished the 1798 Act as “entirely different from the act before us.” 416 Unlike
the sort of admission restriction law that the Court had recently upheld under
the Commerce Clause, the 1798 Act was a deportation law. And in the years
before and after the Chinese Exclusion Case, Field stridently declared that
“there is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government
of the United States.” 417 Instead, he considered the United States “a government of delegated powers, supreme within its prescribed sphere but powerless
outside of it. In this country, sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress
can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted
to it.” 418
Contemporary readers of the Chinese Exclusion Case adopted similar interpretations. The Harvard Law Review described the opinion as a case about
“Treaty Rights” in which the Court declared that Chae’s certificate “conferred
upon him no right to return to the United States of which he could not be
deprived by a subsequent act of Congress.” 419 The San Francisco Chronicle
praised the decision for rejecting “[t]he fine-spun argument of counsel for
Chae Chan Ping that a return certificate constituted a contract with the outgoing Chinaman, by virtue of which the United States was legally bound to
readmit him.” 420 When lower-court judges and members of Congress considered “[t]he question as to the power of congress to regulate the admission of
alien passengers coming to this country,” 421 they typically cited Commerce
Clause cases like the Head Money Cases. They cited the Chinese Exclusion Case
only for the specific principle that Congress could abrogate treaties. 422
Free to exercise the Commerce Clause’s power without worrying about
the constitutionality of violating existing treaties, Congress steadily modified
its immigration statutes after 1889 to secure “a stricter enforcement of the present laws, and for such amendments to be made as would more clearly define

415. Id. at 604.
416. See id. at 610–11.
417. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 467 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting); see also Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 746–50 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
418. Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 467 (Field, J., dissenting).
419. Recent Case, supra note 33, at 136.
420. The Chinese Cannot Come, supra note 243, at 4; see also The Chinese Act Sustained,
BALT. SUN, May 14, 1889, at 1.
421. In re Florio, 43 F. 114, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890).
422. See id. at 115; see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 52-255, at 4 (1892); see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (citing the Chinese Exclusion Case for the proposition that “the
legislative power might pass laws in conflict with treaties”).
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the desirable from the undesirable immigrants.” 423 Beginning in 1890, for example, Congress began appropriating money for “the appointment of suitable
officers to enforce the laws” rather than relying exclusively on state immigration officials and federal customs collectors. 424 In 1891, it added to what would
become a long list of excludable immigrants, including “persons likely to become a public charge,” “polygamists,” “idiots,” and “persons who have been
convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude.” 425 Because so many immigrants like Chae Chan Ping challenged their exclusion in time-consuming federal court proceedings, 426 Congress declared in 1891 that the decisions of immigration officials “shall be
final,” “subject to review [only] by the Secretary of the Treasury.” 427 Congress
also began codifying the specific procedure by which federal immigration officials could evaluate whether an immigrant was excludable—including by authorizing officials to temporarily detain immigrants on shore and strip search
them before deciding whether they could enter the country. 428
When the Supreme Court considered these statutes, it upheld virtually all
of them either by citing the Chinese Exclusion Case and other pre-1890 precedents or by invoking the Commerce Clause. 429 In describing Congress’s discretion to regulate immigration, the Court borrowed heavily from Chief
Justice Marshall’s discussion in Gibbons that the clause gave Congress a “plenary” power in which its “sovereignty” was limited only by the Constitution
and electoral politics. 430 Yet where Chief Justice Marshall used this language
to prohibit New York from interfering with Congress’s discretion, Justice
Field and the rest of the Court used this language to prohibit China and the

423. H.R. REP. NO. 51-3472, at viii (1891); e.g., Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25
(amended 1943) (extending Chinese exclusion by ten years); Act of Apr. 29, 1902, ch. 641, 32
Stat. 176 (repealed 1943) (making Chinese exclusion permanent); Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1630,
33 Stat. 394, 428 (repealed 1943) (reenacting provisions after expiration of treaties with China).
424. Act of Aug. 30, 1890, ch. 837, 26 Stat. 371, 387; see H.R. REP. NO. 50-3792, at 4 (1889)
(calling for the federalization of the general immigration laws); Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26
Stat. 1084 (federalizing the general immigration laws).
425. § 1, 26 Stat. at 1084.
426. See H.R. REP. No. 51-4048, at ii–iii (1891).
427. § 8, 26 Stat. at 1085; see also Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 372, 390 (repealed
1943) (extending finality to Chinese immigrants).
428. § 8, 26 Stat. at 1085; Wong Kai Kah, A Menace to America’s Oriental Trade, 178 N.
AM. REV. 414, 422 (1904); see also Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 206, 27 Stat. 569; Act of Oct. 19, 1888,
ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565–67 (repealed 1943). For early justifications of temporary onshore detention, see H.R. DOC. NO. 59-847, at 10 (1906); C.S. Fairchild, Immigrants—Landing and Examination of, in SYNOPSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE TARIFF, NAVIGATION, AND OTHER LAWS FOR THE YEAR ENDING
DECEMBER 31, 1885, at 359, 359 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1886).
429. See, e.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 334 (1909).
430. Id. at 334–35, 342–43.
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Court itself from interfering with Congress’s discretion. 431 In 1892’s Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, for example, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an immigration law that authorized federal officials to detain and
summarily exclude immigrants without a court hearing. 432 The Court opened
its opinion by invoking “an accepted maxim of international law, that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to
self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or
to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe.” 433 This maxim was relevant not because “inherent . . . sovereignty”
was the source of Congress’s power to exclude people. 434 Rather, it was relevant because it explained why the Court was bound to defer to exercises of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, the Treaty Clause, the Naturalization Clause,
and other “statutes enacted by Congress, upon whom the Constitution has
conferred power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, including the entrance of ships, the importation of goods and the bringing of persons into the
ports of the United States.” 435 Similarly, in 1909, the Court declared that “over
no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete”
than “the authority of Congress over foreign commerce and its right to control
the coming of aliens into the United States, and to regulate that subject in the
fullest degree.” 436 Yet as broad as this language was, it was not a declaration of
unlimited legislative power, but rather a judicial unwillingness to question the
method by which Congress exercised a power that the Court had already upheld. 437 Indeed, the Court was careful not to formally abandon the idea that it
could review the constitutionality of Congress’s immigration laws, even as it
stridently deferred to Congress’s judgments. 438
2.

The Necessary and Proper Clause

Even though the Chinese Exclusion Case didn’t make any doctrinal
changes, it did help to reopen a source of immigration power that had been

431. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
606 (1889).
432. 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
433. Id. at 659.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 334, 339 (1909); see also
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492 (1904).
437. See, e.g., Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 543, 546–47 (1895); Lees v.
United States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893).
438. See, e.g., Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 464 (1920); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3,
9 (1915); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 475–76 (1912); Chin Yow v. United States, 208
U.S. 8, 13 (1908); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905); United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653, 694 (1898); In re Tom Yum, 64 F. 485, 489 (N.D. Cal. 1894); see also
Recent Case, Chinese Exclusion Acts—Exclusion of Chinaman Claiming Citizenship, 19 HARV. L.
REV. 58, 60–61 (1905).
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closed to Congress since 1798: the Necessary and Proper Clause. This reopening began a few years earlier, when the Supreme Court first invited Congress
to regulate immigrants under the Commerce Clause. 439 Accepting this invitation, members of Congress concluded that it was necessary and proper for
Congress to ensure that no immigrants “evaded” its regulations. 440 Accordingly, the year before the Chinese Exclusion Case, Congress began appropriating funds to facilitate the arrest and deportation of immigrants “within the
period of one year after landing or entry.” 441 At the same time, federal courts
also began authorizing officials to detain immigrants on shore instead of in
their ships, a practice that expanded into formal detention centers on Angel
Island in California and Ellis Island in New York. 442
Even after the Supreme Court decided the Chinese Exclusion Case, the
shadow of the Alien Friends Act continued to loom large. Many members of
Congress remained skeptical about federal immigration officers—preferring
instead to rely on state immigration officials. 443 But nativist labor leaders, from
Samuel Gompers to Terence Powderly, remained frustrated with the number
of contract and Chinese laborers they believed were illegally entering the
United States. 444 And a House immigration committee investigating contract
labor issues argued “that the enforcement of all acts designed to regulate immigration should be intrusted to the Federal Government and not to the
States. The regulation of immigration is a matter affecting the whole Union,
and is pre-eminently a proper subject for Federal control.” 445
In 1890, Congress accepted this criticism and hired the first federal officers dedicated to enforcing immigration laws. 446 The following year, with the

439. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 594–96 (1884).
The very first domestic immigration regulations were enacted to enforce federal treaties. See,
e.g., Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 12, 22 Stat. 58, 61 (1882) (repealed 1943). But Congress
did not, at first, appropriate funds toward arrests or deportations away from ports of entry. See
Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486, 488 (1901); Charles Foster, Circular—Exclusion of Chinese, in 1 SYNOPSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND BOARD OF U.S.
GENERAL APPRAISERS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TARIFF, NAVIGATION, AND OTHER LAWS,
FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1892, at 541, 541 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1893).
440. H.R. REP. NO. 52-255, at 1 (1892).
441. Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565–67; see also H.R. 10896, 50th Cong. (1888);
H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 50-396, at 3 (1888).
442. E.g., In re Cummings, 32 F. 75 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887); United States v. Craig, 28 F. 795,
799 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1886); In re Day, 27 F. 678, 680 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886); see also CUAUHTÉMOC
& HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 9, at 24–32.
443. See ADAM GOODMAN, THE DEPORTATION MACHINE 11–21 (2020); see, e.g., 23 CONG.
REC. 3,623 (1892) (statement of Sen. Call); id. at 3,878 (statement of Sen. Palmer).
444. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 51-3472, at 104–05 (1891) (statement of Samuel Gompers,
President, American Federation of Labor); id. at 235–36 (statement of T.V. Powderly).
445. H.R. REP. NO. 50-3792, at 4 (1889).
446. See Act of Aug. 30, 1890, ch. 837, 26 Stat. 371, 387; C.S. Fairchild, Circular—Assignment of Duties Under Acts Relating to Alien Contract-Labor and Exclusion of the Chinese, in
SYNOPSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
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Immigration Act of 1891, Congress completely federalized all immigration
enforcement. 447 And in 1892, when the Chinese Restriction Act of 1882 was
due to expire, Congress enacted the Geary Act, named for Representative
Geary of California. The Act declared that any Chinese laborers who failed to
obtain a certificate of residence by May 1893 “shall be deemed and adjudged
to be unlawfully within the United States, and may be arrested [by certain federal officials] . . . , and taken before a United States judge.” 448 The Act then
required the judge to order the Chinese person’s imprisonment and deportation. 449 If an arrested person claimed to be entitled to live in the United States
without a certificate, he could earn his release only if he could “establish clearly
to the satisfaction of said judge, . . . and by at least one credible white witness,
that he was a resident of the United States at the time of the passage of this
act.” 450
The Geary Act of 1892 was one of the first immigration laws since 1798
that faced serious constitutional objections in Congress. 451 Members furiously
decried its “provisions of savagery rare in legislation” 452 as “harsh and cruel,”453
“unquestionably an act of barbarous legislation,”454 “beyond the power of
Congress,” 455 and “far beyond any bill that probably was ever introduced into
the Congress of the United States.” 456 Senator Sherman of Ohio doubted that
anyone in Congress would think it constitutional to accost “the English, Irish,
Scotch, and French who come here, . . . and require them to show their certificates wherever they went to any officer who might demand it at any time
whatever, upon the penalty of being deported.”457 Senator Palmer agreed that
he had “never imagined a time would come in this country when our condition would render it necessary to place it within the discretion, the absolute
discretion, of that horde of [federal] officers, more or less, all or any of them,
to arrest any human being.” 458
Within months of the Geary Act’s passage, Chinese advocacy organizations raised tens of thousands of dollars to challenge the Act as a resurrection
of “[t]he hated Alien and Sedition Laws, whose unconstitutionality will

TARIFF, NAVIGATION, AND OTHER LAWS, FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1889, at 144,
144–45 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1890).
447. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
448. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25, 25–26 (amended 1943).
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. See 23 CONG. REC. 2,913–14 (1892) (statement of Rep. Hitt); see also id. at 3,524 (statement of Sen. Chandler).
452. 23 CONG. REC. 2,914 (1892) (statement of Rep. Hitt).
453. Id. at 3,481 (statement of Sen. Sherman).
454. Id. at 3,877 (statement of Sen. Call).
455. Id.
456. Id. at 3,480 (statement of Sen. Sherman).
457. Id. at 3,871.
458. Id. at 3,878.
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scarcely be questioned by any one to-day.” 459 By the time the Act took effect on
May 5, 1893, over 85 percent of Chinese residents in the United States had
refused to register. 460 On May 6, three Chinese residents of New York—Fong
Yue Ting, Wong Quan, and Lee Joe—initiated test cases against the Act. 461
One of them reported that he could not produce a white witness as the Act
required, leading a federal judge to order him deported. 462
Although the lawyers for Fong Yue Ting cited the Chinese Exclusion Case
and Nishimura Ekiu as Commerce Clause cases, 463 they also anticipated that
the solicitor general might defend the Geary Act as an “incident of sovereignty.” 464 They therefore strenuously objected “that there is no such thing as
an inherent power of sovereignty resting in Congress, that is not conferred
upon it by the Consti[tu]tion.” 465 Citing Justice Field’s opinions rejecting the
idea of inherent powers, the lawyers observed that “Congress has never been
upheld in the attempt to exercise any power as an inherent power of government, but only as it may have been given to it by the Constitution or the
amendments thereto.” 466 Canvassing the rest of the Constitution, they concluded that there were only two occasions when Congress could deport a U.S.
resident: “Congress has the same power to expel a friendly alien resident as a
punishment for a crime as it has to expel a citizen as a punishment for a
crime,” and “Congress has power under the Constitution, as an incident to the
power to declare war, to expel an alien enemy.” 467
Defending the Geary Act, Solicitor General Aldrich ignored Fong Yue
Ting’s lawyers’ bait and refused to justify the statute as an exercise of sovereignty alone. Instead, as in the Chinese Exclusion Case, he cited international
lawyers to argue that “there is a sovereign power somewhere, either in the
Congress, the States, or the people, to prevent the intrusion of objectionable
strangers into the country, and to remove them from it.” 468 To prove that this
power resided in Congress, he then turned to the one enumerated power Fong
Yue Ting’s lawyers had ignored: the Necessary and Proper Clause. “That the

459. Brief on behalf of the Petitioners at 47, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893) (No. 1345) (quoting 1 H. VON HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 40 (John J. Lalor & Alfred B. Mason trans., 1887) (1876)); The Six Companies Will Fight: They Are Ready to Contest the Geary Law’s Constitutionality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 1893, at 1.
460. H.R. REP. NO. 53-70, at 2 (1893).
461. Brief on behalf of the Petitioners, supra note 459.
462. Id. at 4–5.
463. Id. at 37.
464. Id. at 18–19.
465. Id. at 19.
466. Id. at 20–21.
467. Id. at 17.
468. Brief for the Respondents at 30, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)
(No. 1345).
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United States have all powers necessary and proper to carry the granted powers into effect is a principle of constitutional interpretation too well established to require argument,” he wrote. 469
Conceding that resident immigrants were not literally in commerce, the
solicitor general cited the Chinese Exclusion Case for the proposition that the
Necessary and Proper Clause permitted Congress to make its regulations of
commerce more effective. 470 In fact, he argued, by listing all the other enumerated powers that gave Congress “complete control . . . over our foreign relations,” the Chinese Exclusion Case gave Congress wide latitude to determine
what counted as necessary and proper. 471 “Any person reading this opinion
will see that the conclusion is based upon the implications necessary to sustain
the express and delegated powers considered as a whole,” he explained. 472 “It
seems sufficient to say that in the exercise of the enumerated powers of the
Constitution, and those implied powers necessary to carry the express powers
into effect, the Federal Government is sovereign, supreme, and [can properly
express its will] through laws of Congress.” 473
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, also known as the Chinese Removal
Case, the Supreme Court agreed with the solicitor general, delivering an opinion that heavily excerpted from his brief. 474 Justice Gray divided his majority
opinion into three parts: “principles of international law, . . . the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and . . . the previous decisions of this court.” 475
As a matter of international law, Justice Gray had no difficulty concluding that
at least one government within the United States could deport any immigrant
that it considered a threat to its welfare. 476 “The right to exclude or to expel all
aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or
in peace, [is] an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation,” he declared. 477
Justice Gray next turned to “whether the manner in which Congress has
exercised this right . . . is consistent with the Constitution.” 478 He began by observing that the Constitution vested the federal government “with the entire
control of international relations[,] and with all the powers of government
necessary to maintain that control and to make it effective.” 479 He then para-

469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 35–36 (quoting The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
Id. at 36–37.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 34.
149 U.S. 698 (1893).
Id. at 732.
Id. at 704–711.
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id. at 711 (emphasis added).
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phrased the list of enumerated powers from the Chinese Exclusion Case, including the Necessary and Proper Clause. 480 Quoting Alexander Hamilton
and John Marshall’s famous definition of the Necessary and Proper Clause, he
declared that if “the end be legitimate,” then Congress could enact “all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end.” 481 In this case,
the obvious “end” was Congress’s power to exclude. “The power to exclude
aliens and the power to expel them rest upon one foundation, are derived from
one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of
one and the same power,” Justice Gray wrote. 482 He concluded that when the
Chinese Exclusion Case itself upheld Congress’s exclusion laws, it authorized
Congress “to take all proper means to carry out the system which it provides.” 483
Although the solicitor general and Justice Gray relied heavily on the Chinese Exclusion Case, the author of that opinion, Justice Field, strongly dissented from Fong Yue Ting’s “extraordinary doctrines.” 484 From Field’s
perspective, there was “a wide and essential difference” between his opinion
upholding an exclusion law and this opinion upholding a deportation law, the
latter of which he regarded as unnecessary, improper, and “severely denounced” by James Madison in 1798. 485 Not only did Field “utterly dissent”
from the majority’s willingness to condone the Geary Act as a necessary and
proper exercise of Congress’s sovereign powers, but he also warned of “a great
deal of confusion in the use of the word ‘sovereignty.’ ” 486 He presciently anticipated that the majority’s discussion of “inherent and inalienable” sovereign
rights might soon be interpreted to give Congress an “unlimited and despotic
power so far as aliens domiciled in the country are concerned.” 487
As Justice Field predicted, Fong Yue Ting’s interpretation of the Necessary
and Proper Clause—combined with the Chinese Exclusion Case’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause—invited Congress to enact far more restrictive
legislation than anyone would have guessed permissible in 1875. So long as
Congress called its legislation necessary and proper to enforce its exclusion
laws, it appeared that the Court would uphold the regulations. 488 “Given the
power to exclude, [Congress] has a right to make that exclusion effective,” the

480. Id. at 712.
481. Id. at 713 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819)).
482. Id.
483. Id. at 714.
484. Id. at 744 (Field, J., dissenting).
485. Id. at 746–50, 759.
486. Id. at 757.
487. Id. at 755–57; see also id. at 760 (“The decision of the court and the sanction it would
give to legislation depriving resident aliens of the guaranties of the Constitution fills me with
apprehensions.”).
488. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917); United States ex rel.
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 289–91 (1904).
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Court unanimously affirmed later that year. 489 In the name of making its exclusion laws effective, Congress spent the next twenty years appropriating unprecedented sums for raiding, arresting, detaining, and summarily deporting
“all Chinese persons found to be unlawfully in the United States”—a precedent it expanded to include other immigrants as well. 490
E. The Long-Term Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Case
Although Congress’s immigration legislation dramatically expanded in
scope in the twenty years after the Chinese Exclusion Case, both Congress and
the Supreme Court continued to evaluate the constitutionality of federal immigration laws with reference to Congress’s enumerated powers—just as opponents of the Alien Friends Act had done a century earlier. The main
doctrinal difference between 1798 and 1898 was that Congress had begun invoking the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. These
references to enumerated powers began to disappear in the early twentieth
century, however, as Congress passed increasingly aggressive domestic immigration laws that went well beyond enforcing its exclusion legislation. To uphold these laws, Congress and the Court embraced two new justifications, the
last of which read the Chinese Exclusion Case as if it recognized a plenary and
unlimited Immigration Clause.
The shift began in 1907, when Congress enacted a law to prohibit immigrants from engaging in prostitution for “three years” after their arrival. 491 As
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Commerce Clause permitted Congress
to impose this sort of temporary condition on anyone who wanted to voyage
into the country. 492
In 1910, however, Congress repealed the “three years” language, thereby
permanently prohibiting immigrants from engaging in prostitution. 493 For a
woman like Helen Bugajewitz, who had immigrated to the United States long
before there were any federal bans on prostitution, this 1910 amendment had
the effect of imposing a new restriction on her domestic conduct that could
not be justified under existing doctrine. 494 Because the prostitution ban did
not exist when she first entered the United States, it could not be described as
a regulation of her voyage into the country. Nor could it be described as necessary to make Congress’s entry conditions effective—at least with respect to
immigrants already in the United States.

489.
490.
added).
491.
492.
493.
494.

Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893).
See, e.g., Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 372, 390 (repealed 1943) (emphasis
Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 899.
See Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 97–99 (1903).
Act of Mar. 26, 1910, ch. 128, § 3, 36 Stat. 263, 264–65 (repealed 1917).
Bugajewitz v. Adams,  U.S. ,  ().
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Federal officials soon attempted to deport Bugajewitz for engaging in
prostitution after the 1910 amendment took effect. 495 Faced with a deportation that could not be upheld as a condition on entry, the Supreme Court impatiently upheld the deportation anyway. “It is thoroughly established that
Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the
country it deems hurtful,” the Court wrote, citing Fong Yue Ting. 496 In a similar case the following year involving a woman named Anna Lapina, the Court
defended this theory by citing the Chinese Exclusion Case. 497 “The authority of
Congress over the general subject-matter is plenary,” the Court wrote; “it may
exclude aliens altogether, or prescribe the terms and conditions upon which
they may come into or remain in this country.” 498
Neither Bugajewitz nor Lapina offered any doctrinal rationale for this
new theory of congressional power that relied on Congress’s “plenary” authority. They simply treated the theory as an application of prior cases, particularly the Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting. But by authorizing
Congress to regulate the conditions not only of an immigrant’s entry but also
of their residence, the Court massively expanded the federal government’s domestic power with respect to immigrants. 499 The Court did not defend the
1910 immigration law as a regulation of foreign commerce or necessary to
enforce such regulations. Rather, it declared that Congress’s authority over the
entire subject of immigration—exclusion, deportation, and residence—was
“plenary.” 500
This definition of “plenary” power differed from how the Chinese Exclusion Case or any immigration case previously used the term. In Gibbons v.
Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that when Congress exercised one of its
enumerated powers, Congress’s authority was “plenary” in the sense that neither New York nor any other government could restrain that authority if it
were within constitutional limits. 501 Justice Field reached a similar conclusion
in the Chinese Exclusion Case, adding that if Congress acted within constitutional limits, then the Court would defer its exercises of discretion. 502 Neither
decision invited Congress to regulate anyone whose presence in the country it
deemed hurtful, regardless of whether the Constitution authorized such regulation.

495. See id. at 590–91.
496. Id. at 591.
497. Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 88 (1914).
498. Id. (emphasis added).
499. See Siegfried Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent
Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 262, 263–69 (1959) (discussing the significance of this development); Brief of the Nat’l Laws. Guild as Amicus Curiae at
8–9, Niukkanen v. McAlexander, 362 U.S. 390 (1960) (No. 130) (same).
500. Lapina, 232 U.S. at 88; see also Bugajewitz, 228 U.S. at 591.
501. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
502. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604
(1889).
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Nevertheless, it did not take long for Congress to take advantage of the
Court’s new plenary power doctrine. Summarizing Lapina in 1916, the Senate
Committee on Immigration giddily reported that the Court “emphatically and
distinctly” upheld Congress’s power to deport any “undesirable” immigrants
it wanted—and at any time. 503 After “labor[ing] earnestly in its efforts to keep
out the most undesirable of those coming to our shores,” Congress passed the
Immigration Act of 1917. 504 The Act authorized the deportation of several
new groups of people, including “any alien who at any time after entry shall
be found advocating or teaching the unlawful destruction of property, or advocating or teaching anarchy.” 505 The federal government soon enforced this
law to suppress the Industrial Workers of the World and other leftist organizations whose members Congress pilloried as “revolutionary radicals, convicted criminals, individuals with long police records, anti-American
propagandists, and individuals known to be, or reasonably suspected of being,
enemy agents.” 506 A 1920 law even paralleled the Alien Friends Act, giving the
secretary of labor unreviewable authority to deport a number of detained immigrants if he considered them to be “undesirable residents of the United
States.” 507
After over a century in which judges and members of Congress rejected
the premise that sovereignty permitted Congress to exercise powers that the
Constitution itself failed to authorize, the Court cited the Chinese Exclusion
Case and Fong Yue Ting as if they held that the sovereignty of border control
alone was sufficient to justify any legislation. 508 When the Supreme Court in
the 1950s cited these decisions, it interpreted them as holding that “[t]he exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty,” for which enumerated
powers and the judicial restraints imposed on ordinary domestic legislation
were basically irrelevant. 509 Although the Court insisted that it was doing
nothing more than confirming “the traditional power of the Nation over the
alien . . . [,] leav[ing] the law on the subject as we find it,” 510 it in fact cited the
Chinese Exclusion Case to justify a new, unexplained “power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” 511
503. S. REP. NO. 64-352, at 15 (1916).
504. See H.R. REP. NO. 64-95, at 7 (1916); Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874
(repealed 1952).
505. § 19, 39 Stat. at 889.
506. S. REP. NO. 66-283, at 2 (1919); see also SALYER, supra note 18, at 234; H.R. REP. NO.
66-504, at 4 (1919).
507. Act of May 10, 1920, ch. 174, 41 Stat. 593; see also S. REP. NO. 66-283 (1919).
508. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 722 (1893)); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 278 (1922).
509. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542–43 (1950); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587–89 (1952).
510. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588.
511. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (citing Chae Chan
Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
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Invoking this power in subsequent cases, the Court has invited Congress to
regulate immigrants however it wants—even where a law could not be justified as an exercise of one of Congress’s enumerated powers.
Federal immigration law transformed, then—not because of the Chinese
Exclusion Case in 1889—but because of the memory of the Chinese Exclusion
Case decades later. In stark contrast to their predecessors—who sought to
trace the power to deport back to the Constitution—legislators began to point
to Congress’s “sovereign” powers to conclude that “[t]he United States has
plenary power . . . to exclude an alien at any time for a good reason, for a bad
reason, or for no reason at all.” 512 Once Senators concluded that procedurally
rigorous deportation proceedings were “thwart[ing]” the “sovereign power of
this Nation,” Congress began to provide for the lengthy detention of immigrants in federal facilities. 513 And by mere reference to the federal government’s undoubted power to “control its own borders,” 514 Congress authorized
aggressive warrantless immigration raids and arrests throughout the country, 515 created an expansive federal immigration law enforcement agency, 516
punished domestic employers who hired undocumented immigrations, 517 and
denied immigrants public benefits. 518 Even though many of these laws could
be justified as exercises of the Commerce Clause or Necessary and Proper
Clause, immigration is often treated as if a distinct Immigration Clause justified Congress’s actions and permitted regulations that might exceed the scope
of Congress’s ordinary powers.
The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 519 provides a useful illustration of the disconnect between Congress’s modern immigration
laws and its nineteenth-century theory of enumerated powers. With the
IRCA, Congress made it unlawful for domestic employers to hire, recruit, or
refer undocumented immigrants for employment. 520 The Act also required all

512. 86 CONG. REC. 8,345 (1940) (statement of Sen. Ashurst); see also Deportation and Detention of Aliens: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
81st Cong. 6 (1949) (statement of Watson B. Miller, Comm’r of Immigration and Naturalization) (referencing Fong Yue Ting for the proposition that the United States has an “inherent and
inalienable right” to exclude and expel immigrants).
513. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 76-397, at 1 (1939).
514. See 131 CONG. REC. 23, 324–25 (1985) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
515. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973); see also id. at 279 (Powell,
J., concurring).
516. See COHEN, supra note 9, at 18.
517. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in part at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–922, 925); see also
132 CONG. REC. 29,984 (1986) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
518. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 6 (1996) (noting the “compelling [f]ederal interest”
in “reduc[ing] any additional incentive for illegal immigration provided by easy availability of
welfare and other taxpayer-funded benefits”).
519. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986).
520. Id. § 121(a)(1)–(2).
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employers, regardless of size, to collect and inspect specific documentation for
all new hires. 521 By all accounts, IRCA marked an unprecedented expansion
of federal immigration law, shifting the focus of legislation away from the border and toward the interior. 522 It also, for the first time, required domestic
employers—as opposed to transportation companies 523—to assist in enforcement. 524
Yet rather than mentioning a power under Article I or relating employment regulations to the Commerce Clause, Congress justified the IRCA by
sole reference to congressional power at the border. “The authority of Congress—indeed its responsibility—to regulate immigration derives from a
source even higher than the Constitution,” Representative Mazzoli explained. 525 “In fact, the Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that
the control of immigration is an inherent power arising out of national sovereignty and existing without regard to any constitutional grant.” 526 Drawing on
this “inherent power,” Congress imposed these employment laws as a means
of dissuading Central American immigrants from crossing the border—an issue that Senator Simpson argued was stifling the country’s ability to “perform
the most basic function of a sovereign nation, which is to control the entry of
aliens across its borders.”527 The House Report accompanying the bill explained that “[e]mployment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally”
and that limiting employment prospects would thus “deter aliens from entering.” 528 The federal government has relied on the closely related theory of
“Prevention Through Deterrence” to expand the domestic deportation and
detention infrastructure, 529 drawing on the notion that fewer immigrants will
enter the country if they must confront the risks of arrest, 530 of separation

521. Id. § 121(b).
522. Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1583 (2008).
523. See supra Sections II.A.1, II.A.2.
524. Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 564 (2012).
525. 132 CONG. REC. 29,988 (1986) (statement of Rep. Romano Mazzoli).
526. Id.
527. 131 CONG. REC. 23,316 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simpson); see also id. at 23,324
(statement of Sen. Grassley) (“[T]he United States has lost one of the cardinal attributes of sovereignty—it no longer controls its own borders.”).
528. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, at 46 (1986); see also 132 CONG. REC. 29,984–85 (1986) (statement of Rep. Rodino); 142 CONG. REC. 7,300 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). For a helpful
explanation of this “magnet” theory, see Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the
Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1112–13 (2009).
529. See JASON DE LÉON, THE LAND OF OPEN GRAVES 29–37 (2015).
530. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ENDGAME: OFFICE OF DETENTION AND REMOVAL
STRATEGIC PLAN, 2003–2012 (2003) (arguing that increasing the probability of domestic apprehension will deter future border crossings).

May 2022]

The Imaginary Immigration Clause

1481

from their minor children, 531 and of encountering deadly obstacles while
crossing the border. 532
A similar disconnect was on display ten years after the passage of IRCA,
when the Senate first considered a bill to prohibit non-citizens from voting in
federal elections. 533 When introducing the bill, its proponents failed to mention the scope of Congress’s power under the Elections Clause 534 or the fact
that the “power to disenfranchise ha[d] traditionally been seen as a power belonging to the states alone.” 535 This novel extension of congressional power
was passed with remarkably little debate and by simple reference to the plenary power doctrine: “[T]he Supreme Court has made such extraordinary
statements over the years,” Senator Simpson explained. 536 In fact, “[o]ver no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it
is over the admission of aliens.” 537 The Court has “explicitly recognized” that
federal legislation can favor citizens in the interest of encouraging naturalization, 538 Simpson added. By this logic, abandoning the enumerated-powers
constraint has given Congress essentially inscrutable power to do anything
that limits the appeal of immigrating to the United States or that heightens the
appeal of becoming a citizen.
To be clear, no Supreme Court decision has directly cited the Chinese Exclusion Case since 2001. 539 Instead, the Court often ties Congress’s immigration laws back to the powers “[t]o establish [a] uniform Rule of
Naturalization” and “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” 540 Yet, in
stark contrast with its typically skeptical review of Congress’s legislation, 541

531. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY (Apr. 23,
2018). See generally SOBOROFF, supra note 9.
532. See DE LÉON, supra note 529, at 29–37 (describing the idea that more arduous and
dangerous border crossings will reduce the number of people willing to attempt entry).
533. This law eventually became 18 U.S.C. § 611.
534. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1 (1996); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (granting Congress
the power to “make or alter” regulations pertaining to federal elections).
535. Stephen E. Mortellaro, The Unconstitutionality of the Federal Ban on Noncitizen Voting and Congressionally-Imposed Voter Qualifications, 63 LOY. L. REV. 447, 450 (2017); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 104-469. Although the Supreme Court “has never held that aliens have a constitutional right to vote or to hold high public office under the Equal Protection Clause,” Sugarman
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973), it has never suggested that Congress has the power to disenfranchise noncitizens. The distinction between states and Congress is significant because the
theory of enumerated powers in the U.S. Constitution has never applied to states.
536. 142 CONG. REC. 8,665 (1996) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
537. Id. (statement of Sen. Simpson) (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766
(1972)).
538. Id.
539. Shawn E. Fields, The Unreviewable Executive? National Security and the Limits of Plenary Power, 84 TENN. L. REV. 731, 752 (2017).
540. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3–4); see
Cleveland, supra note 1, at 160–61 (“[T]he Court has reformulated [Congress’s immigration]
power as arising to some degree from the Constitution’s enumerated provisions.”).
541. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 557–58 (2012).
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the Court eschews detailed analysis of how a particular immigration law relates to naturalization or foreign commerce. 542 These nominal references to
the enumerated powers are supplemented by continued reference to the federal government’s “inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct [foreign] relations”—a power that gives Congress “undoubted” jurisdiction over
immigrants. 543 The Court does exercise “some level of constitutional judicial
review” over immigration laws, 544 but has “firmly and repeatedly endorsed the
proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” 545 The modern plenary power doctrine has
therefore made it possible for Congress to exercise exclusive and broad power
to exclude, arrest, detain, regulate, and deport immigrants. 546
III. THE MODERN LEGACY OF THE CHINESE EXCLUSION CASE
Judges, practitioners, and academics have increasingly contested both the
breadth and validity of the Supreme Court’s “plenary” power over immigrants. A chorus of scholars have urged the Court to apply the Constitution’s
explicit limits—particularly the Due Process Clause—to congressional regulation of immigration. 547 Others have critiqued the idea that the nation’s “sovereignty” and its powers over foreign relations can sustain the breadth of

542. See, e.g., Toll, 458 U.S. at 10.
543. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 387, 395 (2012) (citing United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)).
544. Fields, supra note 539, at 757 (emphasis added); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the
Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV.
57, 60–63 (2015).
545. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80
(1976)); see also Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 27 (2015); Martin, supra note 39, at 39; Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” 68 FLA. L. REV. 179, 193–94 (2016).
546. The historical and conceptual connection between the source of Congress’s immigration powers and the application of constitutional limits has become somewhat muddled in contemporary academic discourse. Indeed, some scholars have argued that powers “inherent in
sovereignty”—including the federal government’s immigration powers—could seamlessly be
limited by the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 39, at 273–75; Victor C. Romero,
Elusive Equality: Reflections on Justice Field’s Opinions in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting,
68 OKLA. L. REV. 165 (2015). But the chronic misinterpretation of the Chinese Exclusion Case
sits at the root of both the Court’s reluctance to identify the source of Congress’s immigration
power and its unexplained deference to immigration regulations, even in the face of explicit constitutional commands. At least some scholars have recognized that limited judicial review is integral to the idea of so-called “sovereign” powers. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 1; Susan Bibler
Coutin, Justin Richland & Véronique Fortin, Routine Exceptionality: The Plenary Power Doctrine, Immigrants, and the Indigenous Under U.S. Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 97, 99 n.11 (2014).
And as Professor Don Herzog explains, a truly “sovereign” power—at least in the classical
sense—would be “unlimited,” “undivided,” and “unaccountable,” and thus constrained by neither the text of Article I nor the Constitution’s implied and external limits. DON HERZOG,
SOVEREIGNTY, RIP, at xi (2020).
547. See sources cited supra note 39.
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modern immigration laws. 548 And the Court itself has begun to supplement
its references to “sovereignty” by mentioning certain enumerated powers as
the basis of Congress’s regulatory power. 549 Despite these developments, the
Chinese Exclusion Case continues to loom large. Most judges, legislators, and
scholars take for granted that the plenary power doctrine originated with the
decision accepting that even if “the precise source of the exclusive congressional power to regulate immigration is far from clear, it is nonetheless wellestablished.” 550
The misreading of the Chinese Exclusion Case as a source of Congress’s
plenary immigration power continues to have two lasting effects on immigration doctrine and scholarship. First, it has invited courts and Congress to
abandon enumerated powers with respect to immigration laws. By contrast,
since the end of the nineteenth century—right when the Court began to firmly
disavow judicial review of Congress’s immigration laws—the Court developed
a number of new doctrines that allowed it to closely scrutinize congressional
regulation of business owners and white citizens, prohibiting Congress from
invoking Article I to “regulate an individual from cradle to grave.” 551 Second,
and more crucially, the misreading of the Chinese Exclusion Case has allowed
Congress and the Court to avoid offering a cogent explanation for the anomaly between Congress’s immigration power and its other powers. Neither the
history of the Chinese Exclusion Case nor the relationship between immigration and foreign affairs can support the weight of these discrepancies.
A. The Inconsistency Between the Regulation of Immigrants and Citizens
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court adopted
a general posture of deference toward all of Congress’s legislation. As Chief
Justice Marshall declared in Gibbons v. Ogden, “the sovereignty of Congress,
though limited to specified objects, [was] plenary as to those objects.” 552 The
Court generally declined to scrutinize Congress as it exercised its enumerated
powers, save for ensuring compliance with the limits “prescribed in the constitution.” 553 Beyond that, any attempt to cabin the exercise of congressional
power would have to be effected via “the influence which . . . constituents possess at elections.”554 Yet notwithstanding the Court’s deferential review, both
the Supreme Court and Congress justified federal immigration legislation as

548. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note , at ; NEUMAN, supra note , at , –;
Lindsay, supra note , at –, –.
549. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012) (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 4) (referencing the power to “establish a uniform rule of naturalization”).
550. Schuck, supra note 2, at 24.
551. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 557–58 (2012).
552. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (emphasis added).
553. Id. at 196.
554. Id.
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an exercise of Article I—first as an exercise of the war powers 555 and later as
“necessary and proper” to the regulation of foreign commerce. 556
Gibbons adopted a weak version of legislative constitutionalism, an idea
that political processes—not judicial review—are the most legitimate and effective method of resolving disagreements about the source of Congress’s
powers. 557 This theory made sense in contexts like Gibbons, in which Congress
regulated voters who could oppose abusive laws by electing politicians who
shared their views. 558 It was demonstrated in practice by the Alien and Sedition Acts, which were repealed not by the Supreme Court but by voters who
rallied around the Democratic-Republicans and wielded their “influence . . . at elections.” 559
But in the late nineteenth century, Justice Field and his colleagues distorted this call for legislative constitutionalism in two striking ways, both of
which contributed to the legal toleration of white supremacy. First, during the
same decades when the Supreme Court deferred to Congress in the Chinese
Exclusion Case, the Court abandoned Marshall’s judicial deference when Congress regulated white citizens and politically powerful domestic business interests. Second, the Court retained Marshall’s judicial deference only in
contexts when Congress regulated disenfranchised people, such as immigrants, Native Americans, and territorial residents. The result was a selective
application of judicial deference: one in which the Court invented new protections for white voters while inexplicably leaving Congress alone to regulate
everyone else.
1.

Diverging Doctrinal Paths

From the end of Reconstruction through the rise of the Lochner era, the
Supreme Court adopted a number of novel doctrines that limited Congress’s
power to regulate domestic capitalism and white citizens. This project began
with the imposition of implied limits on Congress’s legislative powers. In Collector v. Day, 560 the Supreme Court intervened to protect state officers and
governments from federal income taxation. 561 Although there was “no express
provision in the Constitution that prohibit[ed] the general government from
taxing the means and instrumentalities of the States” or their governments,
the Court concluded that the exception could be read by “necessary implica-

555. See supra text accompanying notes 95–100.
556. See supra text accompanying notes 433–474.
557. See BELLAMY, supra note 41, at 4, 91 (describing this as political constitutionalism).
We refer to legislative constitutionalism strictly in the context of judicial review of federal legislation, not state legislation.
558. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
559. Id. at 197.
560. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871), overruled in part by Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe,
306 U.S. 466 (1939).
561. Id. at 128.
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tion” from the structural relationship between the states and the federal governments. 562 The political checks that were so central to the Court’s analysis
in Gibbons were nowhere to be found in Day.
The idea that the Supreme Court must protect the states from congressional overreach animated the continued narrowing of Congress’s powers after the fall of Reconstruction. Responding to state-sanctioned violence against
black Americans throughout the South after the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, 563 Congress had enacted a series of “enforcement
acts” designed to entrench the right to vote, to suppress the power of the Ku
Klux Klan, and to prohibit racial discrimination by white business owners and
citizens. 564 But when white citizens started challenging these enforcement acts,
the Supreme Court read Congress’s power narrowly, concluding that Congress lacked the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against individuals. 565 The Fourteenth Amendment did not “invest Congress with power
to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation” or
“to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights.” 566 And
in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court made clear that Congress’s powers under
the Reconstruction Amendments were not “plenary,” unlike its power to regulate “commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes.” 567
Notwithstanding this distinction between the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court quickly narrowed Congress’s supposedly
“plenary” power to regulate interstate commerce. When Congress passed
novel antitrust 568 and labor 569 laws at the turn of the century, the Supreme
Court concluded that Congress could only regulate those activities that “directly” affected interstate commerce. 570 By contrast, Congress could not pass
labor laws that only “indirectly” impacted commerce: Congress’s power
would otherwise extend to “every conceivable subject” and “obliterate all the
limitations of power imposed by the Constitution.” 571
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Court had firmly adopted
two irreconcilable visions of judicial review. When Congress expanded the

562. Id. at 127.
563. Id.; ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING 143–44 (2019).
564. See Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 99,
16 Stat. 433; Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335,
invalidated in part by United States v. Stanley (The Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
565. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554–55 (1876); United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629, 638 (1883).
566. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
567. Id. at 18.
568. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209.
569. E.g., Employers’ Liability Act of 1906, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232.
570. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); The Employers’ Liability
Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
571. The Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. at 502.
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scope of its power to deport and detain immigrants, the Court entrusted constitutional interpretation to a supposedly benevolent Congress. 572 The Court
adopted a similar approach when reviewing federal statutes regulating socalled unincorporated territories and Native American tribes. The power to
legislate over the “islands and their inhabitants” must be “entrusted to Congress,” the Court wrote in Downes v. Bidwell. 573” Plenary authority over the
tribal relations of the Indians . . . has always been deemed a political one, not
subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government,” the
Court explained two years later. 574 Echoing Chief Justice Marshall’s refrain in
Gibbons, the justices emphasized that any possible redress would have to be
sought by an appeal to Congress itself, 575 notwithstanding the fact that those
most affected by this legislation were largely disenfranchised from the political
process. The “influence which . . . constituents possess at elections”—designed to check congressional excesses in light of the Court’s deferential posture576—was largely illusory when Congress regulated immigrants, tribes, and
“unincorporated” territories. By contrast, the Court opened its doors to constitutional claims by wealthy white business owners and state officials—exactly those individuals most likely to have a voice both in Congress’s chambers
and at the ballot box.
2.

Persistent Inconsistencies

These inconsistent theories of congressional power persist in the Court’s
review of federal legislation today. When evaluating laws that regulate domestic business interests, the Court has continued to monitor the exercise of Congress’s enumerated powers closely. The Commerce Clause, the Court has
clarified, “requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local.” 577 And despite the broad language of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, the Court has required that all “necessary” legislation be “convenient,
or useful,” “narrow in scope,” and “incidental” to the beneficial exercise of an
enumerated power. 578 To be “proper,” a law must also be “consist[ent] with

572. See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924).
573. 182 U.S. 244, 283 (1901).
574. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); see also Cleveland, supra note 1, at
71–73 (discussing Lone Wolf and its relationship to inherent powers).
575. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568; Downes, 182 U.S. at 283 (concluding that legislation dictated by Congress’s “selfish interests” would surely receive “quick rebuke at the hands of the
people”).
576. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196–97 (1824).
577. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000).
578. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 559–60 (2012) (internal quotations
omitted).
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the letter and spirit of the constitution”579 and cannot compromise “essential
attributes of state sovereignty . . . by the assertion of federal power.” 580
The reflexive resort to “sovereignty” as the basis of immigration laws has
allowed the Court to avoid applying these same doctrines to the regulation of
immigrants. The federal government has assumed a nearly unlimited body of
legislation over immigrants, including in traditional state realms. 581 Yet the
Court has not required that these laws be “narrow in scope” or considered
their relationship with the “essential attributes of state sovereignty.” 582
Perhaps most strikingly, Congress has granted the federal government the
broad authority to arrest, detain, and deport immigrants without warrant,
long after their entry into the country. 583 This regulatory regime is exceptional
when viewed in light of the Court’s modern Commerce Clause doctrine. The
Court has affirmed that Congress’s power over interstate commerce extends
to the regulation of people traveling in interstate commerce, 584 and goods that
previously traveled in interstate commerce remain subject to federal regulatory jurisdiction even after they have concluded their journey across state
lines. 585 But in no other context has the Court asserted that just because a person has crossed a state or international border, Congress retains indefinite
power to regulate her pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Outside of the immigration context, the Court has written that the Commerce Clause “is not a
general license to regulate an individual from cradle to grave, simply because
he will predictably engage in particular transactions.” 586
B. The Missing Explanation for the Existing Regime
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever explained why Congress can enact immigration laws without reference to Article I and without
the same federalism or enumerated-power limits the Court typically imposes
on congressional legislation. Throughout the past century, a mere reference
to the Chinese Exclusion Case was sufficient—on the theory that Justice Field’s
opinion supports a “sovereign” immigration power disconnected from the
text of the Constitution. Yet that case simply cannot carry the weight it has

579. Id. at 559 (internal quotations omitted); cf. Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary AND Proper”
and “Cruel AND Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 721–22 (2016).
580. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 560 (quoting United States v. Comstock, 560
U.S. 126, 153 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also John F. Manning, The Supreme Court,
2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2014)
(discussing the federalism limitations that characterize the Court’s “proper” inquiry).
581. See Stumpf, supra note 522, at 1582.
582. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 560 (internal quotations omitted).
583. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973).
584. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (sustaining a prohibition on
crossing state lines with a woman for the purpose of prostitution).
585. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 225 (1976) (upholding a prohibition
on receipt or possession of firearms that previously traveled “in interstate commerce”).
586. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 557.
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been assigned: as discussed in Part II, the reference to “sovereignty” merely
reaffirmed Congress’s power to employ its “sovereign” Article I powers. 587 The
Court has also not justified its deferential stance toward immigration law as
an outgrowth of an earlier tradition of legislative constitutionalism expressed
by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons—especially in light of the widespread
disenfranchisement of immigrants and the Court’s departure from legislative
constitutionalism in reviewing Congress’s domestic regulation.
1.

The Relationship Between Foreign Affairs and Immigration

When courts have endeavored to justify plenary immigration power beyond a mere reference to the Chinese Exclusion Case, they most frequently cite
the close relationship between immigration and foreign relations. Because immigration laws implicate the country’s diplomatic relationships and its standing on the world stage—the argument goes 588—the judicial doctrines designed
to limit congressional power and protect state interests are inapposite to Congress’s immigration power. Yet the connection between immigration and foreign relations cannot justify the anomalous status of Congress’s immigration
powers.
The idea that the nation’s immigration policy implicates Congress’s powers over foreign affairs is not new. A century before the Chinese Exclusion Case
was decided, Henry Lee invoked this rationale in defense of the Alien Friends
Act, writing that “[w]ith respect [to immigration], America is one nation.”589
But the foreign affairs rationale did not form the basis of a plenary power doctrine at the time: rather, Lee invoked the “one nation” idea to conclude that
“state governments are restrained from interfering” in the federal government’s deportation laws. 590 In this vein, he argued that the power to admit
immigrants was properly located in Congress, which had been granted authority to regulate immigration in various clauses of Article I, including the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 591 This same notion pervaded the nineteenthcentury cases striking down state immigration laws: regulating the entry of
immigrants was “a subject which concern[ed] our international relations,” 592
which is why it was “confided exclusively to the discretion of Congress by the
Constitution” in the Foreign Commerce and Treaty Clauses. 593
Yet as the federal immigration infrastructure expanded throughout the
course of the twentieth century, the Court began to categorize prostitution
587. See supra text accompanying notes 402–414.
588. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394–95 (2012); Balkin, supra note 40,
at 28. For further discussion of the relationship between immigration and foreign affairs, see
NEUMAN, supra note 18, at 136; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the
Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 11–12 (1990).
589. MINORITY ADDRESS, supra note 89, at 6.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 7.
592. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1876).
593. Id. at 271; see also Lindsay, supra note 18, at 26.
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and other laws that regulated immigrants—not just those touching on admission and removal—as the exclusive domain of the federal government. 594
“[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations,” the Court
wrote in 1952. 595 The Court began to strike down a broad swath of state laws
regulating immigrants, noting that immigration policy “can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation” and that
“[p]erceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States may lead to harmful
reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad.” 596 Because even domestic
regulation concerning registration cards 597 and welfare benefits 598 might implicate the United States’ relationship with foreign countries, the federal government alone had to be given broad power to regulate immigrants.
On this account, the plenary power doctrine exists out of necessity: if
Congress were confined to legislate pursuant to the enumerated powers and
subject to the Court’s stringent judicial review under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, it could neither effectively manage its foreign relations 599 nor preempt state laws that interfere with them. 600 Yet as Professor
Legomsky has clarified, the Court is decidedly not selective in its application
of the foreign affairs rationale to immigration laws 601: even where it concludes
that foreign relations are not necessarily implicated, the Court draws on the
connection with foreign affairs to grant Congress broad deference. 602 This approach is also fundamentally out of step with the Court’s approach to foreign
relations law beyond the immigration context. Justice Sutherland’s pronouncement in United States v. Curtiss-Wright 603 that the limits of enumeration did not apply to foreign affairs 604 has never been read to grant Congress
plenary power domestically. 605 Congress presumably could not draw on its
“foreign affairs” powers to preempt state criminal laws simply because they

594. See Lindsay, supra note 545, at 199–204, 211 & n.176, 217–18.
595. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952) (emphasis added).
596. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (citing Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588–
89).
597. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
598. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
599. See Fields, supra note 539, at 750 (“Immigration is one of the nation’s many policy
tools in the foreign arena . . . .”).
600. See Balkin, supra note 40, at 28.
601. Legomsky, supra note 39, at 262. But see Lindsay, supra note 545, at 237 (describing
the Court’s rejection of a foreign affairs rationale in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 638 (2001)).
602. See Legomsky, supra note 39, at 262 (describing this phenomenon in Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787 (1977)).
603. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
604. Id. at 315–16.
605. It is also worth noting that the Court has largely abandoned the foreign affairs exceptionalism espoused in Curtiss-Wright. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1919–35 (2015).
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spark controversy with the nation’s allies. 606 Yet this is precisely how the Court
treats Congress’s immigration laws.
Despite the Court’s pronouncement to the contrary in Arizona v. United
States, Congress does not need an unenumerated “foreign affairs” power to
protect immigrants from discrimination by state governments. 607 The Supreme Court has long scrutinized state immigration laws more searchingly
under the Equal Protection Clause than their federal counterparts. 608 State
“classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny,” the Court wrote in
Graham v. Richardson. 609 And Congress can continue to exercise its authority
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause to bar states
from discriminating against immigrants. 610 Neither the Court’s foreign affairs
doctrine nor the necessity of preemption can coherently explain the anomalous status of immigration law.
2.

Assessing Congress’s Power

Ultimately, neither the Chinese Exclusion Case nor Congress’s authority
to conduct foreign relations can sustain the idea that Congress’s immigration
powers “derive[] from a source even higher than the Constitution.”611 Denaturalizing Congress’s “plenary” immigration power in this way offers us the
opportunity to assess our modern immigration laws as an exercise of Congress’s Article I powers. Within this framework, it is difficult to justify understanding the Commerce Clause as two fundamentally different grants of
power, which modulate in accordance with the subject of Congress’s regulation. Applied domestically, the same clause cannot grant Congress the power
to pass nearly any law regulating the daily lives of non-citizens while denying
Congress the power to mandate health insurance coverage for all residents. 612
And if Congress has the power to enact any law that would improve the
United States’ relationship with its allies, then it is incoherent for the Court to
invalidate ordinary domestic legislation that might do so while upholding
only immigration restrictions.
IV. TOWARD A LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
Once we recognize that the anomalous place of immigration law is neither
historically predetermined nor doctrinally defensible, two possible paths for
resolution are available. Many scholars and activists have urged the Court to

606.
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.

See Legomsky, supra note 39, at 264.
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012).
See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86–87 (1976); Stumpf, supra note 522, at 1582.
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
132 CONG. REC. 29,988 (1986) (statement of Rep. Romano Mazzoli).
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 557–58 (2012).

May 2022]

The Imaginary Immigration Clause

1491

subject Congress’s regulation of immigrants to its ordinary skeptical review.613
Under this approach, the Supreme Court might consider whether Congress’s
immigration laws align with its Commerce Clause precedents, curtailing the
scope of Congress’s power to regulate immigrants from the “cradle” to the
“grave” 614 and carefully evaluating whether certain immigration laws compromise “essential attributes of state sovereignty.” 615
Yet denaturalizing the plenary power doctrine does not require a resort
to the Supreme Court or to a cabined vision of congressional power. Indeed,
we argue that the history of Congress’s immigration powers makes clear that
legislative solutions—inspired by the tradition of legislative constitutionalism
that animated the first century of federal immigration law—are far more
promising in the fight toward a more just immigration framework. Rather
than intervening to protect immigrants from an overzealous Congress, the Supreme Court has powerfully entrenched the plenary power doctrine in the
congressional and public psyche. This version of judicial review has stifled serious legislative debate about the constitutional scope and policy merits of
Congress’s immigration powers over the past century. And as elsewhere, the
Court has largely declined to serve as a meaningful counter-majoritarian
check on congressional power over disenfranchised immigrants. Drawing
from these conclusions, this Part argues that rather than turn to the courts to
impose a restrictive version of Article I on Congress’s immigration regulations, we should encourage legislators to rethink whether the Constitution—
and our political morality—permit the expanse of immigration laws in effect
today.
A. Legislative Constitutionalism Modeled After 1798
The history of Congress’s immigration power reveals the promise of a legislative solution to the immigration anomaly. In the century before the emergence of the modern plenary power doctrine, legislators and executive branch
officials engaged in fierce and contested debate about the constitutional scope
of Congress’s immigration powers. 616 In 1798 and beyond, Democratic-Republicans mounted a vigorous campaign against the constitutionality of the
Alien Friends Act, arguing that the Act was “neither among the specific powers granted by the Constitution to the General Government, nor necessary to
carry into effect any of those specific powers.” 617 Even after the epidemic of
anti-French sentiment swept the Alien Friends Act into legal effect, citizens
and legislators deployed the tactics of popular constitutionalism to highlight

613. See, e.g., Condon, supra note 39; Legomsky, supra note 39; Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra
note 39; Henkin, supra note 39; Schuck, supra note 2.
614. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 557–58.
615. Id. at 559–60 (quoting United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 153 (2010) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
616. See supra Sections I.B., I.C.
617. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2993 (1799); see supra text accompanying notes 147–152.
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the Act’s unconstitutionality and undermine its legitimacy. 618 These constitutional challenges—presented in town squares and in the halls of Congress—
helped inspire “a mighty wave of public opinion” that swept the Federalist
Party out of power 619 and left the Alien Friends Act to expire in infamy. 620
That the Democratic-Republicans framed their opposition to the Alien
Friends Act in constitutional terms inspired the Federalists to canvass Article
I in search of a source for Congress’s power to deport both immigrant
“friends” and “enemies.” 621 The Federalists persuasively argued that the War
Clauses allowed Congress to exclude and expel immigrants from countries
that had threatened to invade the United States. 622 Yet the Democratic-Republicans successfully convinced the public that neither the War Clauses nor any
other clause in Article I supported Congress’s ability to deport so-called alien
friends. 623 This constitutional back-and-forth had a powerful, lasting effect on
Congress’s understanding of its own powers, as the Alien Friends Act was memorialized as “a flagrant violation of the Constitution” 624 while the Alien Enemies Act survived unscathed.
Though framed in constitutional terms, this debate required legislators to
carefully advance a normative justification for each extension of congressional
power over immigrants. When Congress assessed its power to remove “alien
friends,” it considered not only whether the War Clauses objectively allowed
for such legislation but also the normative implications of reading a broad
power to prevent invasion into Article I. If the Necessary and Proper Clause
gave Congress the power to deport immigrants in the interest of merely preventing war, legislators argued, Congress would be able to justify almost any
action in the name of national security, 625 including “attack[ing] the liberties
of the citizens themselves.” 626 Rather than waiting for the Supreme Court to
do so, members of Congress assumed responsibility for assessing both the
constitutional source of their power and the normative implications of exercising it.
The legislative constitutionalism of 1798 extended throughout much of
the nineteenth century. Even as a renewed wave of anti-immigrant sentiment
swept from the port states of California and New York to Congress in the
1880s, legislators continued to interpret the scope of their constitutional authority. They considered the extent of Congress’s power to enforce treaties
under the Necessary and Proper Clause 627 and to regulate immigration under
618.
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620.
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622.
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624.
625.
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See supra text accompanying notes 196–202.
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the Commerce Clause, 628 over the objections of their colleagues who denounced the injustices arising from hasty and restrictive exclusion laws. 629
And when Congress sought to expand its domestic powers over immigrants
in 1892, legislators decried the Geary Act as “barbarous” and “beyond the
power of Congress.” 630
Yet once the Supreme Court began to read the Chinese Exclusion Case as
the basis of Congress’s “plenary,” “sovereign” power over immigrants, this
constitutional discourse started to dry up. 631 When Congress sought to
“purg[e] [the] body politic of poisonous elements” 632 through new sedition
laws and registration requirements in 1940, 633 select few legislators contested
the bill’s constitutionality, arguing that it was a “new alien and sedition bill”
incompatible with “our constitutional principles.” 634 But rather than respond
to these critiques on their constitutional merits—as the Federalists had in
1798 635—proponents of harsher detention and deportation laws could recite
the common refrain that the “Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that the right to exclude or expel is an inherent and inalienable right
of every sovereign and independent nation,” and therefore both Article I and
political morality were irrelevant. 636
By the end of the twentieth century—when Congress proposed new ways
to deter undocumented immigrants from crossing the border—any remnants
of this constitutional debate had dissipated from legislative discourse. Relying
on the Supreme Court’s precedents, legislators simply urged Congress to “exercise its sovereign right—and its sovereign responsibility—to control its borders.” 637
One of the only recent legislative debates framed in constitutional terms
concerned—tellingly—the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler v.
Doe. 638 In Plyler, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law that denied undocumented children access to public education, concluding that this policy
was “difficult to reconcile . . . with the framework of equality embodied in the
Equal Protection Clause.” 639 More than a decade later, members of the U.S.

628. See supra text accompanying notes 382–384.
629. See supra text accompanying notes 385–386.
630. See supra text accompanying notes 451–458.
631. See GOODMAN, supra note 443, at 23; 23 CONG. REC. 3,623 (1892) (statement of Sen.
Call); id. at 3,878 (statement of Sen. Palmer).
632. 87 CONG. REC. 9,032 (1940) (statement of Rep. Hobbs).
633. Alien Registration (Smith) Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670.
634. 84 CONG. REC. 10,361 (1939) (statement of Rep. Celler).
635. See supra Section II.B.
636. H.R. REP. NO. 76-397, at 1 (1939); see also Deportation and Detention of Aliens: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 6 (1949)
(statement of Watson B. Miller, Comm’r of Immigration and Naturalization).
637. 132 CONG. REC. 29,988 (1986) (statement of Rep. Romano Mazzoli).
638. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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House of Representatives introduced a legislative amendment that would have
given the states express permission to deny undocumented children access to
state benefits such public education. 640 Supporters of the amendment argued
that the Plyler decision left open the possibility of federal intervention on the
issue—even as states could not deprive immigrant children of public education on their own initiative. 641 But the amendment was swiftly rebuked. Legislators urged their colleagues to recognize the policy as “unconstitutional”
and “morally repugnant.” 642 Representative Green of Texas noted that if the
amendment passed, “we would see [this] come back to the Supreme Court,
and they would probably rule the same way they did [in Plyler v. Doe].” 643
The terms of this debate underscore how far we have diverged from the
constitutionalism that characterized the first century of U.S. immigration law.
Substantive engagement with the constitutionality of Congress’s immigration
laws is now the exception rather than the norm. And even where members of
Congress mount constitutional objections to immigration laws, 644 the debate
more closely resembles an exercise in predictive judgment about whether the
Supreme Court will think the law is constitutional—rather than a sincere inquiry into the scope of Congress’s powers.
The evolution of immigration legislation in the wake of the plenary power
doctrine is a powerful illustrator of the way in which judicial review can distort
both legislative outcomes and legislative discussion. 645 As Professor Tushnet
describes, “[c]ourts may design some doctrines to reflect their sense of their
own limited abilities, not to reflect directly substantive constitutional values.” 646 Yet legislators attach themselves to these competency-oriented doctrines and begin to consider the “constitutional implications of what they were
about to do in the same terms.” 647 This dynamic is palpable in the interplay
between Congress and the Court on the subject of immigration. The Supreme
Court ostensibly adopted the plenary power doctrine to extract itself from
continuous review of immigration statutes. Yet Congress has marshaled this
same doctrine to avoid discussing the constitutional implications of its own
legislation. 648 And despite growing political will to resist and curtail the
breadth of federal immigration enforcement over the past decade, the robust

640. 142 CONG. REC. 5,651 (1996).
641. Id. at 5651–52 (statement of Rep. Elton Gallegly); id. at 5652 (statement of Rep. Margaret Roukema); id. at 5654 (statement of Rep. Randall H. Cunningham).
642. Id. at 5654 (statement of Rep. William L. Clay).
643. Id. at 5655 (statement of Rep. Gene Green).
644. See supra text accompanying notes 642–643.
645. For broader discussion of this phenomenon beyond immigration law, see MARK
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646. Id. at 60.
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policy debates occurring in state legislatures, in town hall meetings, 649 and in
the press 650 have barely made their way into Congress’s chambers.
B. Judicial Supremacy and Counter-Majoritarian Politics
Rather than considering the constitutional basis of its own immigration
laws, Congress has handed the Supreme Court the power to police the boundaries of the federal government’s immigration powers. This allocation of responsibility aligns to some extent with the idea—articulated by the Court in
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 651—that searching judicial review is
most warranted where legislation affects religious, national, or racial minorities who lack the power to assert their interests through the political process. 652
The Supreme Court’s insulation from partisan politics, the argument proceeds, allows it to evaluate our laws for “prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities . . . , which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.” 653 Within this
framework, laws regulating disenfranchised immigrants are prime candidates
for robust judicial review.
Yet the history of federal immigration law undermines the expectation
that the courts will intervene to protect vulnerable minorities from hostile and
repressive legislation. 654 To the contrary, as Congress enacted increasingly aggressive and xenophobic deportation laws throughout the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth century, the Supreme Court morphed its constitutional law
doctrines to authorize these novel powers. When Congress began to extend
the scope of its immigration laws from the border to the interior, the Court
decided that Congress possessed extensive power to “make [its] exclusion[s]
effective” via domestic regulation. 655 Eventually, confronting deportations

649. See, e.g., NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS GAIN GROUND IN THE
STATES (2019), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Immigrants-Rights-GainGround-in-the-States-2019-12-11.pdf [perma.cc/AK82-3RDX]; Christopher N. Lasch et al.,
Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1721–22 (2018).
650. See, e.g., Felipe De La Hoz, Why ICE Cooperation Is Dangerous Even with Biden in the
White House, APPEAL (Mar. 25, 2021), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/cooperation-withice-after-biden-guidelines [perma.cc/L3P6-V43X].
651. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
652. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
135–180 (1980); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962); Barry
Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002).
653. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4.
654. Cf. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 111,
118–19 (“[T]he Court has ruled in favor of just one African American plaintiff mounting an
equal protection challenge in recent decades.”); Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 1703, 1742–43 (2021).
655. Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893); see supra note 488 and accompanying
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that could not be sustained under any previous constitutional theory, the Supreme Court abandoned the Constitution altogether and allowed Congress to
pass virtually any law as long as it regulated immigrants. 656 Even during the
political frenzy of wartime emergencies—circumstances invoked most frequently to justify judicial oversight of legislative majorities—the Court has
seamlessly permitted the federal government to arrest and detain supposedly
suspicious ethnic and religious minorities. 657
In this sense, the historical trajectory of immigration law illustrates the
notion that courts are “regularly . . . more or less in line with what the dominant national political coalition wants.” 658 As Professor Spann has powerfully
contended, “[t]he formal safeguards of life tenure and salary protection, which
are designed to insulate the judiciary from external political pressures, are not
designed to guard against the majoritarianism inherent in a judge’s own assimilation of dominant social values.” 659 That judges and justices might not
suffer immediate political consequences of a counter-majoritarian decision
will not ensure their willingness to controvert majoritarian political and social
consensus in favor of minority rights, especially when their confirmation process is explicitly designed to favor alignment with majoritarian politics. 660 Indeed, even beyond immigration law, there have been few examples over the
past 250 years of the Supreme Court intervening in a timely fashion to curtail
Congress’s racist or xenophobic impulses. 661
As Professors Bell and Klarman have argued, the Court’s willingness to
protect minorities is in fact highly contingent on majoritarian social and political opinion. 662 The Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, Bell
argues, “cannot be understood without some consideration of the decision’s
value to whites” and to “the economic and political advances at home and
abroad” resulting from the decision itself. 663 And as Klarman illustrates, the
Supreme Court’s decision invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act in United
States v. Windsor 664—though seemingly counter-majoritarian in nature—was
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only conceivable because of the rapid evolution of public opinion that preceded the decision. 665 In the four years before the Court’s decision, President
Obama, the Democratic Party, half of United States senators, and voters in
numerous states publicly expressed their support for gay marriage. 666
Yet this account also suggests that lasting legislative solutions to the immigration anomaly will require giving immigrants more power in the political
process. When the Democratic-Republicans were contesting Congress’s
power to enact the Alien Friends Act in 1798, most immigrants were eligible
to become United States citizens eventually—and thus voters—after a certain
period of living in the country. 667 But by the time Congress turned its ire
against Chinese immigrants, many Chinese Americans had been forever deprived of U.S. citizenship 668—and were thus unable to exercise the same kind
of political influence in response to increasingly harsh deportation laws. To
the extent that the current exceptionality of Congress’s immigration power
relies on the permanent disenfranchisement of immigrants most affected by
Congress’s laws, the denaturalization of the plenary power doctrine must walk
hand in hand with the widespread efforts of advocates to give immigrants
more political power 669 and to create more pathways to citizenship. 670
Notwithstanding the political and structural obstacles to meaningful legislative solutions, the story of Congress’s immigration powers reminds us that
turning to the courts to invalidate xenophobic legislation can backfire even
when the specific decision leads to favorable outcomes. 671 Over the past several decades, litigants have asked the Supreme Court to strike down xenophobic state laws on the grounds that Congress—and not the states—is entrusted
with the exclusive power to regulate immigrants. 672 Yet the Supreme Court
has responded to these cases by reaffirming Congress’s “undoubted” and “sovereign” immigration power 673—a conclusion that makes it nearly impossible
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666. Id. at 134.
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668. See Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254 (repealed 1952).
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GOODMAN, supra note 443, at 138, 140–43, and expanding the franchise to immigrants, see
KEYSSAR, supra note 259, at 83–89.
670. See, e.g., American Dream and Promise Act of 2021, H.R. 6, 117th Cong. (2021).
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to challenge xenophobic immigration policy when the federal government is
the entity implementing it. And as we describe above, Congress’s reliance on
the Court as the sole arbiter of constitutional meaning has allowed Congress
to abdicate its own responsibility to interpret and support the Constitution. 674
CONCLUSION
Just as Native American organizers and territorial residents have long ago
abandoned judicial supremacy and turned to Congress to “mitigate the artifacts of American colonialism,” 675 advocates and legislators should encourage
Congress to robustly evaluate the wisdom and constitutionality of its broad
immigration laws and to disavow the idea that Congress’s power to regulate
immigrants is extraordinary or extraconstitutional. 676 Inspired by the Democratic-Republican resistance to the Alien Friends Act, Congress should return
to carefully considering the constitutional source of its power to regulate immigrants; assess the political and legal consequences of grounding its laws in
any particular provision of Article I; and enact more robust civil rights protections for immigrants under its broad power to regulate interstate commerce. 677
As Mark Tushnet has written of Thomas Jefferson’s opposition to the Alien Friends Act, “Jefferson was a smart man and, for his times, a real democrat.
He did not place his hopes in the Supreme Court.” 678 Instead, Jefferson helped
to organize ordinary people to restore the government to “its true principles.” 679
Reimagining Congress’s immigration power today will similarly happen not
with new legal arguments, but only with a new “wave of public opinion.” 680

674. Cf. Waldron, supra note 660, at 1393.
675. See Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1824, 1840, 1847–48.
676. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 654, at 37 (lauding the “legislated rights frame” of the
civil rights acts as having done more “than any judicial decision to confront exclusions based on
race, gender, or disability,” and noting that the legislature might “be seen as the first and most
important defender and propagator of rights”).
677. Id.
678. Tushnet, supra note 53, at 63.
679. Id.
680. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

